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PHARMACISTS’ RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE:  
STRATEGIES FOR SHOWING RESPECT FOR 
PHARMACISTS’ BELIEFS WHILE 
MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CARE FOR 
PATIENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
David Scimio is a pharmacist at a grocery store in Chicago.1  He 
believes that life begins at conception, and therefore does not wish to 
dispense emergency contraceptives, commonly known as the “morning 
after pill.”2  His employer willingly accommodated this belief by 
permitting him to transfer patients seeking this type of medication; 
Scimio was able to refer patients to another pharmacy less than 500 yards 
away.3  However, on April 1, 2005, Rod Blagojevich, the Governor of 
Illinois, overrode this understanding between Scimio and his employer 
by issuing an emergency rule requiring all pharmacies to dispense 
emergency contraceptives “without delay.”4  The impetus of the rule was 
a report of pharmacists in downtown Chicago declining to fill two 
prescriptions for emergency contraception based upon conscientious 
reasons.5 
                                                 
1 E-mail from Defender Online, Center for Law and Religious Freedom, 
clfr@christianlegalsociety.org (Apr. 22, 2005).  Defender Online is the e-mail newsletter of the 
Christian Legal Society’s Center for Law and Religious Freedom. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 29 Ill. Reg. 5586 (Apr. 1, 2005).  Although the rule applies to pharmacies rather than 
pharmacists as individuals, pharmacies will no longer be able to give their pharmacists the 
power to refer patients to other pharmacies, and pharmacists like Scimio will be forced to 
dispense emergency contraception if no one else is on duty who does not have a moral 
objection to dispensing the drugs.  See infra notes 91–98 and accompanying text.  The 
original version of the rule is located at 29 Ill. Reg. 5586, but it has since been amended.  
The current version is found at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91 (2006). 
5 Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies: Hearing Before the H. Small Business Comm., 
109th Cong. 7 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sheila Nix, Senior Advisor to the 
Governor of Illinois).  In each case, the woman was asked to come back a few hours later 
when a different pharmacist would be on duty.  Id. at 7.  In response to the Illinois 
emergency rule, the United States House Committee on Small Business conducted a 
hearing to consider the effects that this type of law is having and could potentially have on 
small businesses.  Id.  The Committee heard testimony from Luke Vander Bleek, an Illinois 
pharmacist who is challenging the new rule; Sheila Nix, the senior advisor to the Governor 
of Illinois; Michael Patton, the executive director of the Illinois Pharmacists Association; 
Linda Garrelts MacLean, who spoke on behalf of the American Pharmacists Association; 
and Megan Kelly, an Illinois resident who experienced a pharmacist refusal.  Their 
viewpoints will be referred to throughout this Note, as they provide real world examples of 
how people have responded to the issue of duty-to-dispense legislation. 
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To date, Illinois is the only state to adopt a rule or law explicitly 
requiring pharmacies to dispense medications with which they may 
have moral objections.6  On the other hand, four states have enacted 
legislation specifically protecting pharmacists’ rights of conscience, and 
many other states have considered similar legislation.7  In fact, this type 
of legislation dates back to the 1970s, when most states enacted some sort 
of legislation protecting rights of conscience in response to the Supreme 
Court decision in Roe v. Wade.8  However, the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (“FDA”) approval of drugs for use as emergency 
contraception has focused attention on whether pharmacists are 
protected by this legislation.9   
This Note will discuss ways in which states can protect the 
consciences of their pharmacists while still providing adequate access to 
medications, using the current controversy over emergency 
                                                 
6 National Women’s Law Center, Pharmacy Refusals 101 (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/8-05Update_PharmacyRefusal101.pdf [hereinafter Pharmacy 
Refusals 101].  However, bills have been introduced in other states and in Congress that 
would impose a duty on pharmacists to fill valid prescriptions that are not contraindicated.  
Cynthia Dailard, Beyond the Issue of Pharmacist Refusals: Pharmacies that Won’t Sell Emergency 
Contraception, GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POL’Y 10-11 (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/3/gr080310.pdf.  In addition, Massachusetts 
has a law requiring pharmacies to provide all commonly prescribed medications.  Women 
Sue Wal-Mart over Contraception, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 2, 2006, at A5  [hereinafter Women Sue 
Wal-Mart].  Three Massachusetts women recently filed suit against Wal-Mart, arguing that 
the store has violated this law by failing to carry emergency contraception.  Id.  Wal-Mart 
only carries emergency contraception in its Illinois stores.  Id.  A new California law going 
into effect on January 1, 2006 would require pharmacists to dispense any legally prescribed 
drug.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 733 (West 2006).  There are three exceptions to this 
requirement: the pharmacist believes the prescription is contrary to law or would cause a 
harmful interaction, the drug is not in stock, or the pharmacist has an ethical, moral, or 
religious objection.  Id.  Pharmacists must notify their employers which drugs they have 
objections to.  Id.  However, “undue hardship” of the employer may override the 
pharmacist’s objection.  Id.  If “undue hardship” is interpreted similarly to the same phrase 
in Title VII, the net effect of this law will likely be that pharmacists will be required to 
dispense all legally prescribed medications.  See infra notes 68-71. 
7 Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Refusing To Provide Health Services (Aug. 1, 
2005), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/index.html [hereinafter 
State Policies in Brief]; see also Pharmacy Refusals 101, supra note 6 (listing states that have 
introduced legislation to protect pharmacists).  Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South 
Dakota have conscience clauses that specifically protect pharmacists.  See infra notes 100–12 
and accompanying text. 
8 Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious 
Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 225 (2002); See also State Policies in 
Brief, supra note 7 (providing details on which states have adopted conscience clause 
legislation and who is covered). 
9 Bryan A. Dykes, Note, Proposed Rights of Conscience Legislation: Expanding To Include 
Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L. REV. 565 (2002). 
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contraception as a framework for the discussion.10  Part II discusses the 
history of right of conscience legislation and compares the protections 
currently existing under state law.11  Part III demonstrates that Supreme 
Court precedent does not require a duty to dispense emergency 
contraception and suggests alternatives that accommodate the interests 
of all parties.12  Finally, Part IV provides a proposed statute that would 
resolve these issues.13   
II.  THE CURRENT LAW REGARDING EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION 
This Part provides background information on emergency 
contraception and relevant laws regarding contraception and 
pharmacists’ rights.  Emergency contraception may or may not cause an 
abortion, depending on a person’s judgment as to when life begins.  
                                                 
10 Although contraception and emergency contraception are the primary focus in the 
current debate over pharmacists’ rights and duties, they are not the only type of drug to 
which pharmacists may have moral objections.  For example, Oregon legalized assisted 
suicide through its Death With Dignity Act, and as a result, pharmacists in Oregon may be 
called upon to dispense drugs for use in assisted suicide.  William L. Allen & David B. 
Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 5 J. 
PHARMACY & L. 1, 13 (1996).  The Death With Dignity Act states that health care providers 
shall not be subject to disciplinary action for failure to participate in assisted suicide.  OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (2003).  Thus, pharmacists appear to be covered by this 
provision, but it is not clear whether or not retail pharmacies would be protected.  Alan 
Meisel, Pharmacists, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Pain Control, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 
211, 235 (1999).  However, for pharmacists to assert their rights of conscience, they must 
know that the prescribed drugs are intended for assisted suicide.  Id. at 231.  While 
disclosing the intended use may raise concerns about patient confidentiality, there are 
legitimate reasons for pharmacists to know the prescription’s intended use.  Id. at 230-31.  
When a doctor prescribes drugs to a patient for the purpose of committing suicide, the 
prescription is generally a lethal dose of a drug that is normally used for pain relief.  Id. at 
231.  Pharmacists are responsible for checking the dosage prescribed.  Id.  When 
pharmacists receive a prescription for a lethal dose of a drug, they cannot know whether 
the prescription is erroneous unless they know the intended use.  Id.  If in fact the dose is 
intended to be lethal, there may be additional information that the pharmacist may be 
obligated to give the patient, such as how to take the drug so that it will have the intended 
effect.  Id. at 232.  Oregon is the only state to have legalized assisted suicide, although 
initiatives have been introduced in other states.  Allen & Brushwood, supra, at 11.  
However, most conscience clauses apply primarily to abortion (and sometimes to 
contraception).  Meisel, supra, at 233-234.  Therefore, if assisted suicide were legalized in 
other states, pharmacists may be left vulnerable.  This remains a possibility since the 
Supreme Court recently upheld the Oregon Death With Dignity Act.  See Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).  The Attorney General attempted to proscribe assisted suicide 
through the federal Controlled Substances Act, but the Court ruled that the federal Act 
does not give the Attorney General that authority.  Id. 
11 See infra notes 14-127 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 128-262 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 263-87 and accompanying text. 
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Accordingly, Part II.A describes emergency contraception and its 
possible effects.14  Whether emergency contraception is considered 
abortion or contraception, it would appear to be constitutionally 
protected either under the Supreme Court’s abortion or contraception 
precedent.15  Part II.B discusses the history of conscience clause 
legislation and explains the current scope of the constitutional rights to 
abortion and contraception.16  Part II.C provides background information 
on the practice of pharmacy and how pharmacists might protect 
themselves against civil, disciplinary, or discriminatory action in the 
absence of conscience clause legislation.17  Although some states have 
enacted conscience clause legislation to protect pharmacists, most states 
have no specific legislation on this issue.18  Part II.D gives an overview of 
the states’ current stances on rights of conscience.19  Finally, Part II.E 
discusses the framework for analyzing the constitutionality of laws 
requiring pharmacists to dispense medications to which they are morally 
opposed.20   
A. Emergency Contraception and Its Effects  
Emergency contraception is controversial because it may or may not 
cause an abortion.21  Emergency contraception is contraception that may 
be taken up to 120 hours after unprotected intercourse or when regular 
contraception has failed.22  It has technically been available for over 
twenty-five years because many common contraceptive pills can be used 
for that purpose if taken in large enough doses.23  However, no product 
                                                 
14 See infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. 
15 Access to both abortion and contraception are constitutionally protected.  See infra 
notes 32–56 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 57-81 and accompanying text. 
18 See State Policies in Brief, supra note 7. 
19 See infra notes 82-112 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
22 Deborah Friedman, Planned Parenthood, Refusal Clauses: A Threat to Reproductive 
Rights (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/ 
files/portal/medicalinfo/birthcontrol/fact-041217-refusal-reproductive.xml.  Although 
emergency contraception may be taken up to 120 hours after unprotected intercourse, it is 
more effective when taken sooner.  Id. 
23 Planned Parenthood, Emergency Contraception (June 2004), available at 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/medicalinfo/ec/fact-
emergency-contraception.xml [hereinafter Emergency Contraception].  Emergency 
contraception is less effective than precoital methods of contraception.  Id.  Emergency 
contraception can also take the form of a copper-releasing intrauterine device (“IUD”); 
however, the IUD is not recommended for all women.  Id.  In addition, emergency 
contraception has sometimes been used to stop severe hemorrhaging, which is another 
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was specifically labeled and marketed for emergency contraception until 
the FDA approved Preven in 1998, followed by Plan B in 1999.24   
Emergency contraceptive pills can produce one or more of the 
following effects:  (1) delaying or inhibiting ovulation; (2) inhibiting 
fertilization by altering tubal transport of sperm and/or ova; or (3) 
inhibiting implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterine lining.25  
Therefore, if one judges that life begins when an egg is fertilized, 
emergency contraception can be deemed to have the power to cause an 
abortion.26  However, because the FDA has adopted the view that 
pregnancy begins when a fertilized egg is implanted in the uterine 
lining, and has defined abortion as ending pregnancy, drugs such as 
Plan B and Preven are considered emergency contraception rather than 
abortifacients.27   
                                                                                                             
reason that people have advocated duty-to-fill legislation.  Hearing, supra note 5, at 29 
(statement of Sheila Nix).  However, proponents of this type of legislation cite no evidence, 
statistical or anecdotal, that pharmacists would be unwilling to dispense emergency 
contraception for the purpose of stopping hemorrhaging.  Id. 
24 Donald W. Herbe, Note, The Right To Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a 
Pharmacist’s Right To Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. & 
HEALTH 77, 80 (2002).  “Off-label” use of approved medications as emergency contraception 
is legal and was declared safe and effective by the FDA in 1997.  Emergency Contraception, 
supra note 23. 
25 Emergency Contraception, supra note 23.  Sources disagree on how likely emergency 
contraception is to effect implantation.  Compare Emergency Contraception, supra note 23 
(citing studies finding that emergency contraception is more likely to inhibit ovulation), 
with Family Policy Network, Pro-Family Group Calls on Attorney General To Correct Opinion 
(May 16, 2003), available at http://familypolicy.net/va/?p=134 (citing  text indicating that 
emergency contraception usually prevents implantation).  The text cited by the Family 
Policy Network, supra, states, “Ovarian hormones (estrogen) taken in large doses within 72 
hours after sexual intercourse usually prevent implantation of the blastocyst, probably by 
altering tubal motility, interfering with corpus luteum function, or causing abnormal 
changes in the endometrium.  These hormones prevent implantation, not fertilization.” 
26 See Herbe, supra note 24, at 79-80 (explaining why the label “emergency contraception” 
is conclusory and does not resolve the debate over whether the drug causes an abortion). 
27 Heather M. Field, Note, Increasing Access to Emergency Contraceptive Pills Through State 
Law Enabled Dependent Pharmacist Prescribers, 11 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 141, 188 (2000).  For 
example, in describing how Plan B works, the FDA has stated: 
Plan B works like other birth control pills to prevent pregnancy.  Plan 
B acts primarily by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary 
(ovulation).  It may prevent the union of sperm and egg (fertilization).  
If fertilization does occur, Plan B may prevent a fertilized egg from 
attaching to the womb (implantation).  If a fertilized egg is implanted 
prior to taking Plan B, Plan B will not work. 
FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA’s Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions 
and Answers (May 7, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/planB/ 
planBQandA.htm [hereinafter FDA’s Decision].  By saying that Plan B works to prevent 
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More specifically, drugs labeled as emergency contraception differ 
from abortifacients, such as RU-486, in that abortifacients can remove a 
fertilized egg from the uterine lining, but emergency contraceptives 
cannot.28  Additionally, abortifacients are not sold in pharmacies.29  
However, several states have authorized pharmacists to prescribe 
emergency contraception themselves, thus allowing women to obtain 
access to emergency contraception without ever seeing a doctor.30  In 
addition, emergency contraception has recently been made available to 
adults over the counter.31   
B. The History of Conscience Clause Legislation and the Current Scope of the 
Constitutional Rights to Abortion and Contraception 
While its characterization is not clear, emergency contraception 
likely fits somewhere within the Supreme Court’s precedent on abortion 
or contraception.32  These precedents inspired legislators to adopt 
                                                                                                             
pregnancy, while acknowledging that it may prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, the 
FDA has made a policy decision that pregnancy begins after implantation.  Id.  The AMA 
has also adopted the position that pregnancy begins at implantation, as have many medical 
dictionaries.  Herbe, supra note 24, at 86. 
28 Herbe, supra note 24, at 79.  The FDA approved the drug known as RU-486 or 
mifepristone in 2000 for use as an abortifacient.  Id. at 78.  Mifepristone may have other 
uses, but the only FDA-approved use is as an early pregnancy abortifacient.  Id. at 78-79.  It 
may be prescribed during the first forty-nine days after a woman’s last menstrual cycle.  Id. 
at 82. 
29 Id.  Doctors distribute the drug directly to patients.  Id. 
30 Hearing, supra note 5, at 64 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean, Member, American 
Pharmacists Assoc.).  Pharmacists in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, and Washington have the authority to prescribe and dispense emergency 
contraception.  Id.  Other states, including Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont, have also considered giving 
pharmacists this authority.  Id. 
31 Jim Ritter, ABC’s of Plan B: ‘Morning-after’ Pill Available in Drugstores Next Week, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at 3.  While making emergency contraception available over the 
counter to adults may alleviate the conflict between patients and pharmacists who do not 
want to dispense the drugs, there are still serious concerns about emergency 
contraception’s appropriateness for over the counter status for minors.  See JULIE 
WHEELAND, POPULATION RESEARCH INST., UNDER THE TABLE: WHY THE U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT APPROVE THE OVER-THE-COUNTER DISTRIBUTION OF 
MORNING AFTER PILLS (2004), available at http://www.pop.org/under_the_table.pdf.  
Wheeland argues that claims concerning emergency contraception’s ability to prevent 
abortions are unproven, studies indicate that women of all ages have trouble 
comprehending appropriate use of emergency contraception based on the product’s label, 
there are potential medical safety issues, and risks to adolescents have not been adequately 
studied.  Id. 
32 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing the possible effects of 
emergency contraception). 
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conscience clauses.33  In Roe v. Wade, the Court first recognized a 
qualified right to abortion as an extension of the right to privacy.34  Due 
to concerns about how this ruling would affect the medical profession, 
Congress enacted the Health Programs Extension Act, which protects a 
doctor’s decision not to perform abortions.35  This Act makes clear that 
the receipt of federal funding under the Public Health Service Act or the 
Community Mental Health Centers Act cannot be conditioned on an 
individual’s or an entity’s willingness to provide abortion or sterilization 
services.36  The Act further forbids entities that receive these funds from 
                                                 
33 Holly Teliska, Note, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the 
Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 
229 (2005). 
34 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).  Roe attempted to balance the interests of 
pregnant women and the state by laying out a trimester framework.  Id. at 164-65.  During 
the first trimester, the decision to have an abortion was left to women and their doctors.  Id. 
at 164.  During the second trimester, the government was permitted to regulate abortion in 
a way that advanced maternal health and safety concerns.  Id.  During the third trimester, 
the government could choose to proscribe all abortions that were not necessary to protect 
the life or health of the mother.  Id. at 164-65.  In Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, the 
Court dropped the trimester framework.  505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).  The Court permitted the 
government to regulate abortion from the beginning of the pregnancy on, which is now 
allowed in the interest of the fetus as well as the mother, but the government may not 
proscribe any abortion until after viability.  Id. at 878-79.  The Court still requires the 
government to permit abortions that are necessary to protect the health and safety of the 
mother even after viability.  Id. 
35 Relevant portion codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000).  The Public Health Service Act 
was originally enacted in 1944 to create the office of the Surgeon General, the National 
Institute of Health, the Bureau of Medical Services, and the Bureau of State Services.  Public 
Health Service Act, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944).  Since then, there have been many 
amendments and additions to the Public Health Service Act authorizing the federal 
government to make various grants, contracts, and loans relating to health care services.  
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 300hh-13 (2000 & Supp. 2002).  The provision’s Community Mental 
Health Centers Act have since been superseded or repealed.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2697b. 
36 Id. § 300a-7(b).  Section (b) states: 
The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the 
Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, 
or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction 
Act by any individual or entity does not authorize any court or any 
public official or other public authority to require – 
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any 
sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or 
assistance in the performance of such procedure or abortion 
would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or 
(2) such entity to – 
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of any 
sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of 
such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by 
the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral 
convictions, or 
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discriminating in employment on the basis of the employee’s willingness 
or unwillingness to participate in abortion or sterilization procedures.37  
                                                                                                             
(B) provide any personnel for the performance or assistance 
in the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion 
if the performance or assistance in the performance of such 
procedures or abortion by such personnel would be contrary 
to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such 
personnel. 
Id. 
37 Id. § 300a-7(c).  Section (c) states: 
(1) No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan, or loan 
guarantee under the Public Health Service Act, the Community 
Mental Health Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities 
Services and Facilities Construction Act after the [date of 
enactment of this Act]  June 18, 1973, may – 
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or 
termination of employment of any physician or other health 
care personnel, or 
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges 
to any physician or other health care personnel, because he 
performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful 
sterilization procedure or abortion, because he refused to 
perform or assist in the performance of such a procedure or 
abortion on the grounds that his performance or assistance 
in the performance of the procedure or abortion would be 
contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions, or 
because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions 
respecting sterilization procedures or abortions. 
(2) No entity which receives after [the date of enactment of this 
paragraph] July 12, 1974, a grant or contract for biomedical or 
behavioral research under any program administered by the 
[Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare] Secretary of Health 
and Human Services may– 
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or 
termination of employment of any physician or other health 
care personnel, or 
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges 
to any physician or other health care personnel, because he 
performed or assisted in the performance of any lawful 
health service or research activity, because he refused to 
perform or assist in the performance of any such service or 
activity on the grounds that his performance or assistance in 
the performance of such service or activity would be 
contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions, or 
because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions 
respecting any such service or activity. 
Id. 
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Forty-six states followed the federal government’s lead and enacted their 
own legislation granting various protections for health care providers.38 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued other rulings clarifying that 
the scope of the right to abortion only entails freedom from unduly 
burdensome government interference rather than an affirmative duty on 
the government to provide abortions or to make them more accessible.39  
The first of these cases is Beal v. Doe, in which the Court held that the 
Medicaid Act does not require states to fund abortions that are not 
medically necessary.40  The Court further ruled in Maher v. Roe that states 
                                                 
38 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151 (2003); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 20-16-304 (2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 1996); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-6-104 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
390.0111(8) (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT.  § 453-16(d) 
(1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612 (2004); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3-4 (2004); IND. CODE  §§ 
16-34-1-3 to 7 (1997); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2002); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.31-32 (2001); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1591-1592 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (LexisNexis 
2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.20181- 333.20184 
(2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.414, 145.42 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-1 to 13 
(2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 28-337 to 341 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (LexisNexis 2004); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:65A-1 to 3 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. 
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e)-(f) (2003); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 23-16-14 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN.  tit. 
63, § 1-741 (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 435.475, 435.485 (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
3213(d) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-40, 50 (2002); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-204 (2003); TEX. OCC. CODE 
ANN. §§ 103.001-103.004 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-75 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.065 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
1 (LexisNexis 2001); WIS. STAT.  § 253.09 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-6-105, 106 (2005).  For 
a summary of the provisions contained in these laws, see State Policies in Brief, supra note 7.  
Conscience clause legislation has centered on the problem of health care providers who do 
not want to dispense controversial drugs; however, the converse problem may also occur: a 
health care provider may feel a duty to provide controversial drugs.  See Allen & 
Brushwood, supra note 10, at 16-17 (discussing alternatives for protecting professionals 
who feel a responsibility to dispense controversial drugs, particularly when the 
professional’s employer has decided not to provide the drugs). 
39 See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977).  In Beal, Justice Powell wrote that the state 
“has a valid and important interest in encouraging childbirth,” which exists “throughout 
the course of the woman’s pregnancy.”  Id.  Furthermore, “Respondents point to nothing in 
either the language or the legislative history of Title XIX that suggests that it is 
unreasonable for a participating State to further this unquestionably strong and legitimate 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth.”  Id. at 446.  Therefore, the Court held that the 
omission of nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid funding was not unduly burdensome.  
Id. 
40 Id. at 447.  The Medicaid Act requires states to “include reasonable standards … for 
determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan.”  Id. at 444.  
The Court held that it was not unreasonable for the state to exclude abortions that are not 
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do not have to issue Medicaid benefits for abortions even if they are 
providing funds for childbirth.41  Although denial of Medicaid benefits 
makes it more difficult or even impossible for indigent women to have 
abortions, the Court held that the failure to fund abortions did not place 
an undue burden on the right to abortion because the government had 
not created the obstacle.42  The Court held that the government is 
prohibited from creating undue burdens on the right to abortion; 
however, it is not responsible for removing obstacles not of its own 
making.43  Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that the government 
was permitted to make a value judgment in favor of childbirth and to 
express that judgment through the allocation of benefits.44   
                                                                                                             
medically necessary.  Id. at 445.  This is also how the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, the agency charged with the administration of the statute, interpreted the statute.  
Id. at 447.  Furthermore, given the fact that most states banned abortions that were not 
medically necessary at the time the statute was enacted, the Court believed that Congress 
did not intend to require funding of abortions, but simply to permit them.  Id. 
41 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977).  The Court held that providing Medicaid funds 
for childbirth, but not for abortion, did not discriminate against any suspect class.  Id. at 
470.  Rejecting the Equal Protection argument, the Court turned to the question of whether 
or not the policy impinged on a fundamental right.  Id. at 471. 
42 Id. at 474.  The Court was considering the constitutionality of a Connecticut regulation 
that only provided Medicaid benefits for abortions if they were medically necessary and 
during the first trimester.  Id.  Writing for the majority, Justice Powell stated that the 
regulation in question placed no obstacles in the pregnant woman’s “path to an abortion.”  
Id.  A woman seeking an abortion is not disadvantaged by the fact that the state has chosen 
to fund childbirth, but merely remains in the same position she would be in in the absence 
of the regulation.  Id.  The state in this case “has imposed no restriction on access to 
abortions that was not already there.”  Id. 
43 Id. at 474-75.  Justice Powell wrote: 
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a 
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity 
consonant with legislative policy.  Constitutional concerns are greatest 
when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State’s 
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is 
necessarily far broader. 
Id. at 475-76. 
44 Id. at 474.  Congress later went a step further, amending the Medicaid Act to prohibit 
the use of Medicaid funds for abortions unless the mother is the victim of rape or incest, or 
the abortion is necessary to protect the life of the mother.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
302 (1980).  The Court determined the constitutionality of this amendment (known as the 
Hyde Amendment) in Harris.  Id. at 297.  The controversy in Harris centered around the fact 
that the amendment did not allow funding for abortions that are necessary to protect the 
health of the mother, although the Court has consistently protected abortions that are 
necessary for the mother’s health.  Id. at 301.  The Court upheld the amendment, thus 
determining that the government need not fund even those abortions that have been given 
almost complete protection by the Court.  Id. at 317-18.  Therefore, Harris further clarified 
that the government has no affirmative duty to make abortions available.  Id. at 318.  This 
notion was reaffirmed in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which 
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The Court has also issued rulings that defined the ways in which the 
government may regulate abortion and indicated that the government 
may express a preference for childbirth.45  One way in which a state 
might express its preference for childbirth is through informed consent 
requirements.46  Permissible informed consent requirements include the 
requirement of a waiting period before obtaining an abortion and the 
requirement that the woman be provided with certain information about 
abortion.47  The government may also require a minor seeking an 
abortion to notify or obtain the consent of her parents.48  These 
regulations are permissible because the Court has expressly stated that 
there is not a right to abortion on demand and that the government may 
attempt to persuade a woman not to choose abortion.49  
                                                                                                             
upheld a Missouri law which prohibited the use of public facilities and employees in 
abortions not necessary to save the mother’s life.  See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 
(1977).  An indigent woman brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a city-owned 
hospital that would not perform an abortion for her.  Id. at 519.  The Court determined that 
the city was not required to fund abortions for the same reasons set out in Maher v. Roe.  Id. 
at 521.  The Court also noted that it made no difference that abortions were not funded 
because of the mayor’s personal opposition to abortion.  Id. 
45 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding a twenty-
four hour waiting period, but striking down provisions requiring a woman to notify her 
husband before obtaining an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979) (holding 
that minors can be required to obtain the permission of their parents before obtaining an 
abortion if there is a judicial bypass). 
46 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 886.  In Casey, the Court upheld a twenty-four hour waiting 
period, holding that the delay did not amount to a substantial obstacle to obtaining an 
abortion.  Id. at 886.  The Court also upheld the provision of “truthful, nonmisleading 
information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of 
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus.”  Id. at 882.  The waiting period 
was upheld although it may make obtaining an abortion more expensive and more difficult 
for women who have to travel long distances to visit a doctor.  Id.  The Court has also 
upheld a forty-eight hour waiting period for minors.  See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 
417 (1990). 
47 See supra note 46. 
48 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 649.  Although adult women may not be required to obtain the 
consent of their husbands before obtaining an abortion, minors may be required to obtain 
permission because they may not be able to make informed decisions that are in their best 
interest.  Id. at 634.  Furthermore, in addition to the interest that the state may have in 
promoting childbirth, the parents also have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of 
their children.  Id. at 637.  However, the Court recognized that there might be instances 
when a minor is mature enough to choose abortion or when it is nonetheless in the minor’s 
best interest.  Id. at 643-44.  Therefore, states that require consent or notice must also 
provide the opportunity for a judicial bypass.  Id. at 643-45. 
49 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.  In an opinion authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter, the Court described the states’ power to express opinions on abortions, conveying 
that a woman has a “right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all 
others in doing so.”  Id. at 877.  If a regulation merely creates “a structural mechanism by 
which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the 
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Although the powers and duties of the government have been 
clarified since Roe v. Wade, the Court has not taken a stance on when life 
begins.50  In Roe, the Court acknowledged that experts in medicine, 
philosophy, and theology have been unable to agree upon when life 
begins, and the Court therefore refused to adopt its own definition of the 
beginning of life.51  Because there is no definition of the beginning of life 
                                                                                                             
life of the unborn,” and does not amount to an undue burden, then it is permissible.  Id.  
The opinion further states that “a state measure designed to persuade her to choose 
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.”  Id. at 878.  
Regulations designed to foster the health of the women seeking an abortion are also valid if 
they do not create undue burdens.  Id.  After rejecting the notion that informed consent 
requirements place an undue burden on the right to abortion, the opinion states, “We are 
left with the argument that the various aspects of the informed consent requirement are 
unconstitutional because they place barriers in the way of abortion on demand.  Even the 
broadest reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that there is a constitutional right to 
abortion on demand.”  Id. at 887. 
50 The Court has ruled, however, that an unborn child is not a person within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.  Justice Blackmun wrote: 
The Constitution does not define “person” in so many words.  Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to “person.”  
The first, in defining “citizens,” speaks of “persons born or naturalized 
in the United States.”  The word also appears both in the Due Process 
Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause.  “Person” is used in other 
places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for 
Representatives and Senators, Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and § 3, cl. 3; in the 
Apportionment Clause, Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; in the Migration and 
Importation provision, Art. I, § 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 8; in the Electors provisions, Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and the 
superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office 
of President, Art. II, § 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, § 2, 
cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, 
Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in §§ 2 and 3 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  But in nearly all these instances, the use 
of the word is such that it has application only postnatally.  None 
indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal 
application. . . . [T]ogether with our observation that throughout the 
major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices 
were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 
“person,” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the 
unborn. 
Id. at 157-58. 
51 Id. at 159.  The Court went on to describe various attitudes toward the definition of the 
beginning of life: 
It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking 
on this most sensitive and difficult question.  There has always been 
strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth.  
This was the belief of the Stoics.  It appears to be the predominant, 
though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith.  It may be 
taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant 
community, insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that 
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for purposes of constitutional law, it is unclear whether the Court would 
apply abortion or contraception precedent to emergency 
contraceptives.52   
However, it is also not clear that the distinction would make a 
difference if the Court were to consider whether or not the government 
or third parties have a duty to provide emergency contraception.53  The 
choice to use contraception has been recognized as a fundamental right, 
and therefore appears to be broader in scope than the right to abortion, 
which has been labeled only a liberty interest.54  While the scope of these 
                                                                                                             
have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have generally 
regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and 
her family.  As we have noted, the common law found greater 
significance in quickening.  Physicians and their scientific colleagues 
have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus 
either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at 
which the fetus becomes “viable,” that is, potentially able to live 
outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.  Viability is 
usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur 
earlier, even at 24 weeks.  The Aristotelian theory of “mediate 
animation,” that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma 
until the 19th century, despite opposition to this “ensoulment” theory 
from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life 
from the moment of conception.  The latter is now, of course, the 
official belief of the Catholic Church.  As one brief amicus discloses, this 
is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many 
physicians. 
Id. at 160-61. 
52 See id. at 159. 
53 The Court has been fairly consistent in how it handles the government’s duty to 
subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights.  See infra note 56.  In addition, the 
Constitution does not constrain individuals or business entities.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 401-02 (Aspen Law & Bus. 2001).  “The 
Constitution’s protections of individual liberties and its requirement for equal protection 
apply only to the government.  Private conduct generally does not have to comply with the 
Constitution . . . . [U.S. v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)] is generally regarded as the initial 
articulation of the state action doctrine.”  Id. 
54 The right to use contraception was first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 486 (1965).  Prohibition of contraception was considered a violation of the privacy of 
married couples.  Id. at 485-86.  The Court reasoned that a law prohibiting contraceptives 
could not be enforced without allowing the police “to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives.”  Id. at 485.  In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
the Court determined that the Equal Protection Clause required that single people be 
permitted to use contraception as well.  405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).  The Court reasoned that 
the right to use contraception was an individual right.  Id. at 453.  While Griswold focused 
on the privacy interests of a married couple, the Eisenstadt Court held that a marital couple 
was not an independent entity, but “an association of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional makeup.”  Id.  Therefore, the Court reasoned that “If the right of 
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rights may be different, that does not necessarily mean that the right to 
contraception would translate into an affirmative duty upon the 
government or other parties.55  Fewer cases have dealt with 
contraception, so the Court has not specifically ruled on the duty of the 
government or other parties to provide contraceptives; however, the 
government has not generally been required to subsidize the exercise of 
fundamental rights and liberty interests unrelated to access to the 
courts.56   
                                                                                                             
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”  Id. 
55 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (comparing abortion and 
contraception rights). 
56 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) 
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a provision of federal tax law conditioning tax 
exempt status on the requirement that the organization not participate in lobbying or 
political activities).  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
 We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not 
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the 
right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.  Buckley v. Valeo upheld 
a statute that provides federal funds for candidates for public office 
who enter primary campaigns, but does not provide funds for 
candidates who do not run in party primaries.  We rejected First 
Amendment and equal protection challenges to this provision without 
applying strict scrutiny.  Harris v. McRae and Maher v. Roe considered 
legislative decisions not to subsidize abortions, even though other 
medical procedures were subsidized.  We declined to apply strict 
scrutiny and rejected equal protection challenges to the statutes. 
 The reasoning of these decisions is simple: “although government 
may not place obstacles in the path of a [person’s] exercise of . . . 
freedom of [speech], it need not remove those not of its own creation.”  
Although TWR does not have as much money as it wants, and thus 
cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the 
Constitution “does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be 
necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.”  As we said in 
Maher, “[c]onstitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts 
to impose its will by force of law . . . .”  Where governmental provision 
of subsidies is not “aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,” its 
“power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is 
necessarily far broader.” 
Id. at 549-50.  The government has sometimes been required to subsidize access to the 
courts.  See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that the government must 
waive court fees for indigent persons seeking a divorce); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) (holding that the government must appoint counsel for indigent criminal 
defendants).  However, even in this area, the Court has not always required the 
government to subsidize citizen’s rights.  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 
(1981) (holding that the government does not have to appoint counsel to represent parents 
in cases concerning termination of their parental rights); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 
(1973) (holding that the government does not have to waive bankruptcy filing fees for 
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C. The Practice of Pharmacy 
Pharmacists are currently the most accessible health care providers.57  
Their practice is regulated through state statutes and regulations that 
outline the duties of pharmacists, which generally include screening for 
drug-drug interactions, drug-food interactions, drug-allergy interactions, 
incorrect dosage, incorrect duration, and clinical abuse or misuse.58  
These regulations also designate the actions for which a pharmacist may 
                                                                                                             
indigent persons).  Boddie might be interpreted to mean that where the government 
provides the exclusive means for enjoying a constitutional right, the government must take 
steps to ensure that indigent individuals may still exercise that right.  See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 
382-83.  Therefore, if pharmacists are viewed as state actors, one could argue that they are 
required to ensure adequate access to constitutionally protected products.  See id.  
However, there are two problems with this analysis.  One is that state licensing has not 
sufficed in previous cases to establish state action.  See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 
526 U.S. 40 (1999) (holding that state-licensed insurers who participate in the review of 
worker’s compensation claims are not state actors); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 
163 (1972) (holding that a private club with a liquor license from the state is not a state 
actor).  The other is that Kras undermined the “state monopoly” notion.  409 U.S. at 434.  
Although the majority opinion espoused a belief that Kras had remedies other than 
bankruptcy, this argument is fairly attenuated, and the message seems to be that the state 
control of the remedy is not the factor the Court is most concerned about.  See id. at 453-55 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
57 Hearing, supra note 5, at 60, 70 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean).  There are more 
pharmacists per person than other types of health care providers.  Id.  Pharmacists provide 
access to thousands of types of drugs.  Id. at 66.  Like doctors, pharmacists have their own 
professional organizations.  Id. at 60.  The largest organization of pharmacists in the United 
States is the American Pharmacists Association (“APhA”).  Id.  The APhA advocates access 
to emergency contraception, but also asserts that pharmacists should have the right to 
refuse to dispense drugs to which they are morally opposed.  Id. at 61.  Naturally, the 
APhA endorses professionalism in exercising the right of conscience: “The pharmacist 
should not use their position of power to berate the patient, to share their own personal 
beliefs, or obstruct patient access to therapy–such as refusing to return a patient’s legally 
valid, clinically appropriate prescription.”  Id. at 63.  The APhA believes that there are 
alternatives to duty-to-fill legislation that would provide adequate access to emergency 
contraception without compromising the beliefs of pharmacists.  Id. at 62-63.  These 
alternatives are described in Part III.C.  See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.  The 
APhA favors giving pharmacists right of conscience protections that are similar to those 
already given to doctors.  Hearing, supra note 5, at 69 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean, 
Member, American Pharmacists Assoc.).  The American Medical Association (“AMA”) has 
supported the APhA’s stance that pharmacists should not be compelled to dispense drugs 
when they have moral objections, so long as they do not interfere with the patient’s ability 
to gain access to those drugs.  Id. at 68. 
58 Id.  The APhA favors continued regulation at the state rather than federal level so that 
regulations reflect local needs.  Id.  States have pharmacy boards so that people with 
specialized knowledge, which legislators may lack, regulate the practice.  Id.; see also id. at 
65 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean) (describing how prescriptions may be “lawful” 
but still medically inappropriate). 
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be disciplined.59  Disciplinary measures may include revocation or 
suspension of a pharmacist’s license or fines.60   
In the absence of conscience protections commonly afforded to 
doctors, pharmacists may be vulnerable to civil liability, disciplinary 
action, and employment discrimination.61  The protections that 
pharmacists may have against each of these actions are discussed in 
turn.62  First, a patient who is denied service could pursue a civil 
negligence action against a pharmacist or pharmacy, claiming that the 
pharmacist failed to exercise reasonable care by refusing service.63  A 
pharmacist who gives a good faith referral may be able to establish 
reasonable care, but this could be especially difficult for a pharmacist 
who feels morally unable to provide a referral.64   
Conscientious objectors may also be concerned about disciplinary 
actions.65  No state’s pharmacy rules explicitly obligate pharmacists to fill 
valid prescriptions, but the possibility remains open that they would be 
so construed.66  In fact, Wisconsin took disciplinary action against a 
pharmacist who did not fill or transfer a prescription for emergency 
contraception.67 
                                                 
59 Herbe, supra note 24, at 92. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 77-78; See also Allen & Brushwood, supra note 10, at 5-9 (describing these issues in 
the context of pharmacists with objections to drugs that will be used for assisted suicide).  
Civil liability, disciplinary action, and employment discrimination are the three primary 
issues addressed in the existing state legislation providing pharmacists with rights of 
conscience.  See  ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (2006); 
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-1 to 13 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2004). 
62 See infra notes 63-81 and accompanying text. 
63 Herbe, supra note 24, at 90-91 (theorizing that courts may analogize a refusal to fill a 
prescription for emergency contraception to inaccurate filling of a prescription for 
contraception, because in both cases the patient does not receive the desired medication 
and is exposed to pregnancy or increased risk of pregnancy). 
64 Id. at 88-89. 
65 Id. at 92-93.  As used in this Note, the term “conscientious objector” is not intended to 
be a term of art, but is simply used generically to refer to the situation in which a 
pharmacist is morally opposed to dispensing a medication. 
66 Id. at 93. 
67 In the Matter of the Disciplinary Action Proceedings Against Neil T. Noesen (2004) 
(Case No. LS-0310091-PHM), available at http://drl.wi.gov/dept/decisions/docs/0405070. 
htm.  Pharmacist Neil Noesen refused to fill a prescription for an oral contraceptive 
because he does not believe in the use of contraception.  Id.  Noesen also refused to transfer 
the prescription, and he had not properly notified his employer that he had conscientious 
objections to the use of contraceptives.  Id.  As a result, Noesen was ordered to take classes 
in ethics for pharmacists.  Id. 
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Conscientious objectors might also be susceptible to employment 
discrimination, in which case, the pharmacist might seek protection 
under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).68  
Title VII forbids employers from refusing to hire, discharging, or 
otherwise discriminating against an individual because of the 
individual’s religion.69  The employer is excused from liability if the 
employer can demonstrate that it is unable to reasonably accommodate 
the employee’s religious observance without undue hardship to the 
employer’s business.70  The Supreme Court has ruled that a cost that is 
more than de minimis is an undue hardship to the employer.71 
The de minimis cost standard makes a Title VII claim difficult to 
maintain.72  In Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, the Fifth Circuit 
considered a Title VII claim against a hospital pharmacy that did not 
                                                 
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
69 Id. § 2000e-2(a).  Unlawful employment practices are defined as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
(1)  to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2)  to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id. 
70 Id. § 2000e(j).  Title VII requires employers to make reasonable accomodations of 
employees’ religious beliefs: “The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is 
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.”  Id. 
71 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).  Hardison was 
employed in TWA’s maintenance and overhaul base, which needed to operate all day, 
every day.  Id. at 66.  He became a member of the Worldwide Church of God, and believed 
that he should not work on the Sabbath (sunset Friday to sunset Saturday).  Id. at 67.  
Hardison reported his concerns to his manager, who agreed that he should have the 
Sabbath off whenever possible.  Id. at 67-68.  TWA attempted to accommodate Hardison’s 
beliefs, but the union to which he belonged was unwilling to make exceptions to its 
seniority rules, which gave senior employees first choice of shifts.  Id. at 68.  The Court held 
that abandonment of the seniority system would be more than a de minimis burden on 
TWA, and that TWA should not be required to discriminate against some employees in 
order to give Hardison Saturdays off.  Id. at 84-85. 
72 Allen & Brushwood, supra note 10, at 9; Herbe, supra note 24, at 94. 
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accommodate a Jewish pharmacist who could not work on the Sabbath.73  
The pharmacy attempted to rearrange shifts so that the pharmacist 
would not have to work during the Sabbath, but stopped when it found 
that changing established work schedules lowered the morale of his co-
workers.74  The Fifth Circuit held that rearranging schedules and 
lowering morale constituted undue burdens.75  Conscientious objectors 
might have similar difficulties establishing that accomodation of their 
beliefs are not undue burdens.76 
Additionally, pharmacists who are fired because of their 
conscientious objections might attempt to seek relief through a common 
law wrongful discharge action.77  A wrongful discharge action may be 
brought when the discharge violates public policy.78  Therefore, a 
pharmacist cannot maintain an action for wrongful discharge unless the 
jurisdiction recognizes a public policy of protecting the conscience.79  
                                                 
73 Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982).  Brener was one of five 
pharmacists employed by the hospital.  Id. at 143.  On weekends, one pharmacist only 
manned the pharmacy.  Id.  Shift assignments were allocated on a rotating basis, so that 
each pharmacist would have to work one out of every five weekends.  Id.  The pharmacists 
were free to trade shifts among themselves.  Id. 
74 Id. at 143-44.  After Brener notified his supervisor that his religion prohibited him 
from working on Saturdays, the supervisor intervened and directed the other pharmacists 
to trade shifts with Brener.  Id. at 143.  Previously, the supervisor had not intervened, but 
had left it up to the pharmacists themselves to arrange trades when they needed days off.  
Id.  The supervisor also ordered some additional trades to accommodate Jewish holidays.  
Id.  The supervisor began receiving complaints from other pharmacists, who felt that 
Brener was receiving special treatment.  Id. 
75 Id. at 146-47.  The Fifth Circuit relied on language from Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, stating that it would be “anomalous” to conclude that making a “reasonable 
accomodation” of one employee’s beliefs meant that the employer had to deny shift or job 
preferences to others.  Id. at 146. 
76 See id. at 146-47. 
77 See Allen & Brushwood, supra note 10, at 6-7; 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge §§ 53-
64 (2003) (describing the scope of the public policy exception to at will employment). 
78 Wrongful Discharge, supra note 77, §§ 53-64. 
79 Id.  The three major categories of protected employee conduct that may be protected 
by public policy are: “(1) exercising a statutory right or obligation; (2) refusing to engage in 
illegal activity; and (3) reporting criminal conduct to supervisors or outside agencies.”  Id. § 
53.  Consider the case of Kalman v. Grand Union Co.,  443 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1982).  A pharmacist managed a pharmacy within a grocery store and access to the 
pharmacy could not be separated from access to the store.  Id.  The store manager informed 
the pharmacist that the pharmacy would be closed on July 4, when the rest of the store 
would be open.  Id. at 729.  The pharmacist was under the impression that this was illegal, 
and was terminated when he protested to the pharmacy being closed while the rest of the 
store was open.  Id.  In a wrongful discharge suit against the store, the court held for the 
pharmacist, noting that the pharmacist “was not motivated by his personal values or 
conscience, but rather by his perception of his professional obligations,” thus indicating 
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Even if such a policy is recognized, the employer will probably have an 
overriding business justification for the discharge.80  As a result, 
conscientious objectors will not necessarily be discharged because of 
their beliefs, but because of the economic implications of accomodating 
those beliefs.81 
D. Overview of the States’ Current Stances on Rights of Conscience 
Because of the weaknesses of the protections discussed in Part II.C, 
pharmacists and pharmacies will want to bring themselves under the 
protection of conscience clause legislation if possible.82  Conscience 
clause statutes vary in coverage, with only thirteen states explicitly 
allowing health care providers to refuse to offer services relating to both 
contraception and abortion, and only four explicitly protecting 
pharmacists.83  While few existing conscience clauses explicitly address 
issues relating to pharmacists or emergency contraception, some contain 
language that may be broad enough to cover those issues nonetheless.84  
Naturally, in the absence of explicit language, it is not clear whether the 
statutes will actually be construed to include pharmacists and 
pharmacies.85   
Illinois is illustrative of this problem.  Illinois’s conscience clause, the 
Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act, provides: 
                                                                                                             
that acting according to conscience would not form the basis for a claim of wrongful 
discharge.  Id. at 729-30. 
80 Wrongful Discharge, supra note 77, § 181. 
An employer has a recognized interest in maintaining a business in an 
efficient and profitable condition.  What constitutes good cause for 
dismissal of an employee is generally a matter for an employer’s good 
business judgment; it depends on the particular circumstances of each 
case and involves a balancing of the employer’s interest in operating a 
business efficiently and profitably with the employee’s interest in 
maintaining employment.  However, an employer is not required to 
give the interests of the employees as much consideration as its own 
when it comes to financial matters. 
Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text. 
83 State Policies in Brief, supra note 7.  The states providing rights of conscience regarding 
contraception are Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington.  Id.  
These provisions vary in whether they apply to individuals or institutions and whether 
they apply explicitly to pharmacists and pharmacies.  Id. 
84 For example, many statutes contain catchall phrases that might be construed to 
include pharmacists.  The Illinois statute is an example.  See infra note 95. 
85 See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text (describing the problems in interpreting 
Illinois conscience clause legislation). 
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No person, association, or corporation, which owns, 
operates, supervises, or manages a health care facility 
shall be civilly or criminally liable to any person, estate, 
or public or private entity by reason of refusal of the 
health care facility to permit or provide any particular 
form of health care service which violates the facility’s 
conscience as documented in its ethical guidelines, 
mission statement, constitution, bylaws, articles of 
incorporation, regulations, or other governing 
documents.86   
“Health care” is defined as: 
[A]ny phase of patient care, including but not limited to, 
testing; diagnosis; prognosis; ancillary research; 
instructions; family planning, counselling, referrals, or 
any other advice in connection with the use or 
procurement of contraceptives and sterilization or 
abortion procedures; medication; or surgery or other 
care or treatment rendered by a physician or physicians, 
nurses, paraprofessionals or health care facility, 
intended for the physical, emotional, and mental well-
being of persons . . . .87  
“Health care facility” as defined by the Act includes:  
[A]ny public or private hospital, clinic, center, medical 
school, medical training institution, laboratory or 
diagnostic facility, physician’s office, infirmary, 
dispensary, ambulatory surgical treatment center or 
other institution or location wherein health care services 
are provided to any person, including physician 
organizations and associations, networks, joint ventures, 
and all other combinations of those organizations . . . .88   
The language of the Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act 
appears to be broad enough to cover pharmacies that do not wish to 
dispense certain medications.89  A pharmacy could fall within the 
                                                 
86 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/9 (2004). 
87 Id. at 70/3(a).  
88 Id. at 70/3(d). 
89 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.  In fact, Illinois has one of the broadest 
conscience clauses in the nation.  Dykes, supra note 9, at 569.  The Illinois Healthcare Right 
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category of “dispensary” or “other institution or location wherein health 
care services are provided to any person,” and medication is explicitly 
mentioned in the definition of health care.90  Nevertheless, Illinois 
Governor Blagojevich adopted an emergency rule requiring pharmacies 
to dispense contraceptives “without delay” when presented with a valid 
prescription.91  If the desired contraceptive is not in stock, the pharmacy 
                                                                                                             
of Conscience Act does contain an exception to the right of refusal when emergency 
medical care is required, but emergency medical care is probably limited to life-threatening 
situations, not simply situations where time is of the essence.  Id. at 570-71. 
90 See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.  A broad interpretation of this statute seems to be 
supported by the statement of public policy found within the Health Care Right of 
Conscience Act: 
The General Assembly finds and declares that people and 
organizations hold different beliefs about whether certain health care 
services are morally acceptable.  It is the public policy of the State of 
Illinois to respect and protect the right of conscience of all persons who 
refuse to obtain, receive or accept, or who are engaged in, the delivery 
of, arrangement for, or payment of health care services and medical 
care whether acting individually, corporately, or in association with 
other persons; and to prohibit all forms of discrimination, 
disqualification, coercion, disability or imposition of liability upon 
such persons or entities by reason of their refusing to act contrary to 
their conscience or conscientious convictions in refusing to obtain, 
receive, accept, deliver, pay for, or arrange for the payment of health 
care services and medical care. 
Id. at 70/2. 
91 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(j) (2005).  The rule reads: 
(1) Upon receipt of a valid, lawful prescription for a contraceptive, a 
pharmacy must dispense the contraceptive, or a suitable alternative 
permitted by the prescriber, to the patient or the patient’s agent 
without delay, consistent with the normal timeframe for filling any 
other prescription.  If the contraceptive, or a suitable alternative, is not 
in stock, the pharmacy must obtain the contraceptive under the 
pharmacy’s standard procedures for ordering contraceptive drugs not 
in stock, including the procedures of any entity that is affiliated with, 
owns, or franchises the pharmacy.  However, if the patient prefers, the 
prescription must either be transferred to a local pharmacy of the 
patient’s choice or returned to the patient, as the patient directs. 
(2) For the purposes of this subsection (j), the term “contraceptive” 
shall refer to all FDA-approved drugs or devices that prevent 
pregnancy. 
(3) Nothing in this subsection (j) shall interfere with a pharmacist’s 
screening for potential drug therapy problems due to therapeutic 
duplication, drug-disease contraindications, drug-drug interaction 
(including serious interactions with nonprescription or over-the-
counter-drugs), drug-food interactions, incorrect drug dosage or 
duration of drug treatment, drug-allergy interactions, or clinical abuse 
or misuse, pursuant to 335 ILCS 85/3(q). 
Id.  The emergency rule does not use the term “emergency contraception,” but the drugs 
are included nonetheless because the FDA has taken the stance that drugs such as Plan B 
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is required to stock the drug according to its standard procedures.92  The 
patient may only be transferred if that is what the patient prefers.93  To 
further ensure conformity with this regulation, pharmacies are required 
to post a notice informing patients of their rights and instructing them on 
how to file complaints.94 
                                                                                                             
and Preven only prevent pregnancy.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  Section 
1330.91 only applies to retail pharmacies.  ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(a).  While 
Illinois is the only state that currently has this sort of policy in effect, bills endorsing similar 
legislation have been introduced in a few states.  Dailard, supra note 6, at 10.  Some states, 
while not requiring pharmacists to fill prescriptions to which they are morally opposed, do 
require that pharmacists transfer the prescription.  Id.  Nevada has passed a law to this 
effect.  2005 Nev. Stat. 65.  Although Wisconsin does not currently have any laws requiring 
the transfer of prescriptions, the state’s pharmacy review board disciplined a pharmacist 
who refused to fill or transfer a birth control prescription.  See supra note 67.  While transfer 
may or may not be required, most states do require pharmacists who do not wish to fill a 
particular prescription to return the prescription to the patient if it is legally valid and is 
not otherwise contraindicated.  Hearing, supra note 5, at 63 (statement of Linda Garrelts 
MacLean). 
92 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91.  The phrase “the pharmacy’s standard procedures 
for ordering contraceptive drugs not in stock” has been somewhat clarified by the addition 
of section 3.  See Hearing, supra note 5, at 7-8 (statement of Sheila Nix).  In addition, Illinois 
executives have also interpreted this phrase to mean that a pharmacy that does not 
normally carry contraceptives at all would not have to fill a prescription for emergency 
contraception.  Id. at 15 (statements of Sheila Nix and Rep. Donald Manzullo).  However, a 
pharmacist that normally fills prescriptions for contraceptives, but not emergency 
contraceptives, is still subject to this rule.  Id. at 22 (statements of Rep. Steve King and 
Sheila Nix).  This interpretation has been justified by reliance on the FDA definition of 
contraceptives.  Id. 
93 Hearing, supra note 5, at 22. 
94 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(k).  The notice must be on an eight and one half  
inch by eleven inch paper and “be clearly visible from the area at which the pharmacy 
intakes prescriptions.”  Id.  Section 1330.91(k)(2) lays out the specific language that must be 
used in the notice: 
IF YOU USE CONTRACEPTIVES KNOW YOUR RIGHTS. 
If this pharmacy dispenses prescription contraceptives, then you have 
the following rights under Illinois law: 
The pharmacy must dispense your prescribed contraceptives without 
delay, consistent with the normal timeframe for filling any other 
prescription. 
When your contraceptive is out of stock, you have the following 
options: the pharmacy must cooperate with your doctor to determine a 
suitable alternative, order the contraceptive, or transfer the 
prescription to another pharmacy of your choice. 
You can instruct the pharmacy to return the prescription slip to you at 
any time prior to dispensing. 
You may file a complaint with the Department of Financial and 
Professional Regulation – Division of Professional Regulation through 
the Department’s website http://www.idfpr.com. 
Id. 
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Pharmacists as individuals also are not explicitly mentioned in the 
statute, but could come within the definition of “health care personnel,” 
who are also protected.95  Governor Blagojevich has not denied that the 
Health Care Right of Conscience Act applies to pharmacists, but rather 
justifies his rule on the basis that it applies only to retail pharmacies, 
which have advertised themselves as being in the business of filling 
prescriptions.96  However, the rule applies even to pharmacies that are 
owned and operated by a single pharmacist and to pharmacies where all 
the pharmacists on staff happen to have a conscientious objection.97  
Therefore, even if the rule is properly applied to pharmacies, it can still 
reach conduct of individual pharmacists, whose actions might be 
statutorily protected.98   
Some states have taken the opposite approach from Illinois by 
enacting legislation that explicitly protects pharmacists.99  So far only 
four states have enacted such legislation, although bills for similar 
legislation have been introduced in several other states.100  Among these 
laws, the Mississippi statute affords pharmacists the most protection,  
applying broadly to health care providers, including pharmacies, 
pharmacists, and pharmacist employees.101  It gives health care providers 
                                                 
95 745 ILL. COMP STAT. § 70/3(c) (2004) defines “health care personnel” as “any nurse, 
nurses’ aid, medical school student, professional, paraprofessional or any other person who 
furnishes, or assists in the furnishing of, health care services.”  A pharmacist could be 
considered a “professional” or “other person who furnishes, or assists in the furnishing of, 
health care services.”  See id. 
96 Hearing, supra note 5, at 21-22 (statements of Rep. Steve King and Sheila Nix, advisor 
to the Governor of Illinois). 
97 Id. at 25 (statements of Chairman Donald A. Manzullo and Sheila Nix); see also id. at 36 
(statements of Luke Vander Bleek, owner of a small chain of pharmacies in Illinois) 
(describing how all pharmacists in his pharmacies have conscientious objections to 
emergency contraception and how he has not been able to recruit other pharmacists to 
work in the rural areas where his pharmacies are located). 
98 See supra note 97. 
99 See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
100 Pharmacy Refusals 101, supra note 6.  In 2005, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, 
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin introduced bills that would permit 
pharmacists and/or pharmacies to refuse to dispense medications on the basis of 
conscientious objections.  Id.  The South Dakota bill has been enacted.  See infra notes 106-07 
and accompanying text.  Similar bills were passed in Arizona and Wisconsin as well, but 
were vetoed by those states’ governors.  Pharmacy Refusals 101, supra note 6. 
101 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3 (2005).  Section 3(b) of the Mississippi Health Care Rights 
of Conscience Act defines “health care provider” as follows: 
“Health care provider” means any individual who may be asked to 
participate in any way in a health care service, including, but not 
limited to: a physician, physician’s assistant, nurse, nurses’ aide, 
medical assistant, hospital employee, clinic employee, nursing home 
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the right to refuse to provide any service that violates their 
consciences.102  Therefore, the Act presumably covers any new 
developments in the field of medicine that may raise ethical questions, 
and it eliminates the confusion as to whether drugs such as Plan B and 
Preven fit into the category of abortion or contraception.103  The Act also 
grants health care providers immunity from liability for exercising their 
rights of conscience, and it creates a cause of action when a health care 
provider is discriminated against for exercising the right of conscience.104 
                                                                                                             
employee, pharmacist, pharmacy employee, researcher, medical or 
nursing school faculty, student or employee, counselor, social worker 
or any professional, paraprofessional, or any other person who 
furnishes, or assists in the furnishing of, a health care procedure. 
Id.  Section 3(c) defines “health care institution”: 
“Health care institution” means any public or private organization, 
corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, association, agency, 
network, joint venture, or other entity that is involved in providing 
health care services, including, but not limited to: hospitals, clinics, 
medical centers, ambulatory surgical centers, private physician’s 
offices, pharmacies, nursing homes, university medical schools and 
nursing schools, medical training facilities, or other institutions or 
locations where health care procedures are provided to any person. 
Id. 
102 Id. § 41-107-5.  Section 5(1) of the Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act 
creates rights of conscience for health care providers: 
A health care provider has the right not to participate, and no health 
care provider shall be required to participate in a health care service 
that violates his or her conscience.  However, this subsection does not 
allow a health care provider to refuse to participate in a health care 
service regarding a patient because of the patient’s race, color, national 
origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed or sexual orientation. 
Id.  Section 7 confers the same rights on health care institutions, and section 9 confers rights 
of conscience on health care payers.  Id. §§ 41-107-7, 9. 
103 Id. § 41-107-3.  Section 3(a) of the Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act 
defines health care service as follows: 
“Health care service” means any phase of patient medical care, 
treatment or procedure, including, but not limited to, the following: 
patient referral, counseling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or prognosis, 
research, instruction, prescribing, dispensing or administering any 
device, drug, or medication, surgery, or any other care or treatment 
rendered by health care providers or health care institutions. 
Id.  Since “dispensing or administering any device, drug, or medication” is a health care 
service, and pharmacists, as health care providers, are not required to participate in health 
care services that violate their consciences, the Mississippi Health Care Rights of 
Conscience Act seems to anticipate that controversial drugs may be created in the future 
and protect pharmacists from that contingency.  Id. 
104 Id. § 41-107-5.  Section 5(2) of the Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act 
provides: 
No health care provider shall be civilly, criminally, or administratively 
liable for declining to participate in a health care service that violates 
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Three other states have laws explicitly protecting pharmacists, but 
provide less comprehensive protection than the Mississippi statute.105  
South Dakota allows pharmacists to refuse to dispense abortifacients, 
emergency contraception, or drugs that may be used for euthanasia.106  
                                                                                                             
his or her conscience. However, this subsection does not exempt a 
health care provider from liability for refusing to participate in a health 
care service regarding a patient because of the patient’s race, color, 
national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed or sexual orientation. 
Id.  Sections 7 and 9 provide immunity to health care institutions and health care payers, 
respectively.  Id. §§ 41-107-7, 9.  Section 5(3) proscribes discrimination against health care 
providers who exercise their rights of conscience: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, health care provider, health care 
institution, public or private institution, public official, or any board 
which certifies competency in medical specialties to discriminate 
against any health care provider in any manner based on his or her 
declining to participate in a health care service that violates his or her 
conscience.  For purposes of this chapter, discrimination includes, but 
is not limited to: termination, transfer, refusal of staff privileges, 
refusal of board certification, adverse administrative action, demotion, 
loss of career specialty, reassignment to a different shift, reduction of 
wages or benefits, refusal to award any grant, contract, or other 
program, refusal to provide residency training opportunities, or any 
other penalty, disciplinary or retaliatory action. 
Id.  Sections 7 and 9 proscribe discrimination against health care institutions and health 
care payers, respectively.  Id. §§ 41-107-7, 9.  Section 11 creates a cause of action: 
(1) A civil action for damages or injunctive relief, or both, may be 
brought for the violation of any provision of this chapter.  It shall not 
be a defense to any claim arising out of the violation of this chapter 
that such violation was necessary to prevent additional burden or 
expense on any other health care provider, health care institution, 
individual or patient. 
(2) Damage Remedies.  Any individual, association, corporation, entity 
or health care institution injured by any public or private individual, 
association, agency, entity or corporation by reason of any conduct 
prohibited by this chapter may commence a civil action.  Upon finding 
a violation of this chapter, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to 
recover threefold the actual damages, including pain and suffering, 
sustained by such individual, association, corporation, entity or health 
care institution, the costs of the action, and reasonable attorney’s fees; 
but in no case shall recovery be less than Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00) for each violation in addition to costs of the action and 
reasonable attorney’s fees.  These damage remedies shall be 
cumulative, and not exclusive of other remedies afforded under any 
other state or federal law. 
(3) Injunctive Remedies.  The court in such civil action may award 
injunctive relief, including, but not limited to, ordering reinstatement 
of a health care provider to his or her prior job position. 
Id. § 41-107-11 (2005) (emphasis removed). 
105 See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text. 
106 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2004).  The statute reads: 
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South Dakota’s law also protects both pharmacists and their pharmacies 
from liability and disciplinary or discriminatory action.107  Arkansas’s 
conscience clause offers similar protections, but only applies to 
contraceptives.108  Georgia amended its conscience clause to specifically 
protect pharmacists, but pharmacists are only given the right to refuse to 
fill prescriptions for drugs that have the purpose of terminating a 
pregnancy.109  As a result, pharmacists in Georgia are not allowed to 
                                                                                                             
No pharmacist may be required to dispense medication if there is 
reason to believe that the medication would be used to: 
(1) Cause an abortion; or 
(2) Destroy an unborn child as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(50A); 
or 
(3) Cause the death of any person by means of an assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, or mercy killing. 
No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this section may 
be the basis for any claim for damages against the pharmacist or the 
pharmacy of the pharmacist or the basis for any disciplinary, 
recriminatory, or discriminatory action against the pharmacist. 
Id.  Section 22-1-2(50A) defines “unborn child” as “an individual organism of the species 
homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth”; therefore, the conscience clause should 
apply to emergency contraception since it is still effective after fertilization.  Id. § 22-1-
2(50A). 
107 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  § 36-11-70 (2004). 
108 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (2000).  The statutes reads: 
It shall be the policy and authority of this state that: 
(1) All medically acceptable contraceptive procedures, supplies, 
and information shall be available through legally recognized 
channels to each  person desirous of the procedures, supplies, and 
information regardless of sex, race, age, income, number of 
children, marital status, citizenship, or motive; . . . 
(3) Dissemination of medically acceptable contraceptive 
information in this state and in state and county health and 
welfare departments, in medical facilities, at institutions of higher 
learning, and at other agencies and instrumentalities of this state 
be consistent with public policy; 
(4) Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a physician, 
pharmacist, or any other authorized paramedical personnel from 
refusing to furnish any contraceptive procedures, supplies, or 
information; and 
(5) No private institution or physician, nor any agent or employee 
of such institution or physician, nor any employee of a public 
institution acting under directions of a physician, shall be 
prohibited from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, 
supplies, and information when the refusal is based upon 
religious or conscientious objection.  No such institution, 
employee, agent, or physician shall be held liable for the refusal. 
Id. 
109 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142(b) (2006).  The pharmacist is required to state the objection 
in writing.  Id. 
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refuse to fill prescriptions for “birth control medication.”110  
Additionally, pharmacists are required to make “reasonable efforts to 
locate another pharmacist who is willing to fill such subscription” or to 
return the prescription to the patient.111  While pharmacists are protected 
from liability and disciplinary or recriminatory action, no part of 
Georgia’s conscience clause explicitly protects pharmacies.112   
E. Framework for Evaluating the Constitutionality of Duty-to-Dispense Laws 
Under the Free Exercise Clause 
Laws such as Illinois’s emergency rule—which create a duty to 
dispense despite personal beliefs—might be susceptible to a challenge 
under the Free Exercise Clause.113  Since the Supreme Court decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith, the constitutionality of such laws depends 
on whether they are “generally applicable.”114  In Smith, the respondents 
were employees who had been fired for ingesting peyote, a controlled 
substance under Oregon law.115  Although their use of peyote was in 
                                                 
110 Id.  Pharmacists may refuse to dispense “a drug which purpose is to terminate a 
pregnancy,” but may not refuse to dispense “birth control medication, including any 
process, device, or method to prevent pregnancy and including any drug or device 
approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration for such purpose.”  Id.  However, 
the FDA has approved emergency contraception, and considers these drugs to prevent 
rather than terminate a pregnancy.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  Therefore, 
one wonders whether pharmacists are really protected from dispensing emergency 
contraception.  Furthermore, the statute ignores the fact that some people are opposed to 
contraception in general. 
111 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142(b). 
112 See id. § 16-12-142(b). 
113 See infra note 121 and accompanying text (describing the applicable standard). 
114 See Empl. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court, noted that “[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated 
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the 
press.”  Id. at 881; see, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating compelled 
display of a license plate slogan that offended individual religious beliefs); West Virginia 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating compulsory flag salute statute 
challenged by religious objectors); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) 
(invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system for 
religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny 
a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious).  Justice Scalia also referred to cases 
involving the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 
881; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance 
laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children 
to school). 
115 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.  Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black had been employed 
at a private drug rehabilitation organization.  Id. 
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conjunction with a religious practice, the Employment Division denied 
the respondents unemployment benefits since they had been fired for 
misconduct.116  The Court ruled against the respondents’ Free Exercise 
claim, declining to apply strict scrutiny and concluding that the Free 
Exercise Clause did not bar the application of a generally applicable 
law.117   
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah is the only Supreme Court 
case to extensively interpret and apply Smith.118  In Lukumi, the Court 
declared unconstitutional ordinances of the city of Hialeah, Florida, that 
prohibited animal sacrifices.119  The ordinances were passed in an 
emergency session of the city council in an attempt to prevent the animal 
sacrifice practices of the Santeria, a religion that blends aspects of 
Catholicism with the religious beliefs of African slaves brought to 
Cuba.120  The Court expounded on the neutrality principle of Smith, 
explaining that “a law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious 
practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or 
                                                 
116 Id.  Smith and Black were members of the Native American Church, which uses 
peyote for sacramental purposes.  Id.  Peyote is a hallucinogen derived from lophophora 
williamsii lemaire, a cactus plant.  Id. 
117 Id. at 888-90.  The Court stated: 
Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but 
that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of 
religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of 
them.  Precisely because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of 
people of almost every conceivable religious preference,” and precisely 
because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot 
afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the 
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an 
interest of the highest order. 
Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
118 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
Discussing Smith, the Lukumi Court stated that a law of “[n]eutral and of general 
applicability” does not need to be justified by a compelling government interest even if it 
has an “incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”  Id. at 531.  The Court 
also noted that “neutrality and general applicability are interrelated,” and therefore 
“failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been 
satisfied.”  Id. 
119 Id. at 524.  The ordinances prohibited ritual animal sacrifices, defining “sacrifice” as 
“to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or 
ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.”  Id. at 527. 
120 Id. at 524-27.  Followers of the Santeria religion express their devotion to spirits, called 
orishas, through animal sacrifice.  Id. at 524.  According to the religion, the orishas are 
powerful but not immortal, and therefore depend on the animal sacrifices for survival.  Id. 
at 525.  These sacrifices take place upon several events, including birth, marriage, death, for 
the cure of the sick, the initiation of new members and priests, and annual celebrations.  Id.  
There were an estimated 50,000 adherents of this religion in South Florida at the time of 
this case.  Id. 
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context.”121  In addition, facial neutrality is not determinative; a facially 
neutral law violates the First Amendment if it nonetheless targets a 
religious practice.122  Hialeah’s ordinances were held not to be neutral 
because they clearly referenced a religious practice, and practically the 
only behavior that was forbidden by the ordinance was the sacrificial 
rituals of the Santeria.123   
Whatever stance a state takes on pharmacists’ rights, it must be 
evaluated in terms of the constitutional rights of both the pharmacist and 
the patient.124  While most states have some form of legislation creating a 
right of conscience, only a few explicitly refer to pharmacists.125  
Emergency contraception is the current focus of the tension between 
pharmacists’ and patients’ rights, and the resulting conflicts may give 
rise to civil, disciplinary, or discriminatory actions against 
pharmacists.126  Although pharmacists might be able to defend 
themselves against these actions in the absence of a specific conscience 
clause, such a clause is helpful in determining pharmacists’ rights and 
responsibilities.127   
III.  THE CASE FOR RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE FOR PHARMACISTS 
A review of the Supreme Court’s abortion precedent suggests that a 
pharmacist’s refusal to provide emergency contraception is not a 
violation of the patient’s constitutional rights.128  Because the Supreme 
Court has not required the government to take affirmative steps to make 
abortions available, private citizens should not be required to do so 
                                                 
121 Id. at 533.  When this sort of discrimination occurs, strict scrutiny applies:  “Although 
a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of a law is to 
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not 
neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly 
tailored to advance that interest.”  Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
122 Id. at 534.  The opinion written by Justice Kennedy states that facial neutrality is not 
determinative.  Id.  The Free Exercise Clause forbids “covert suppression of particular 
religious beliefs.”  Id.  “[C]ompliance with the requirement of facial neutrality” cannot act 
as a shield for government action that targets religious practices.  Id.  The Court will 
“survey meticulously” laws that create “religious gerrymanders.”  Id. 
123 Id. at 535.  The Court also found that the law was not of general applicability because 
it was too underinclusive given the city’s stated purpose of preventing cruelty to animals.  
Id. at 536.  The ordinances created an exception for the slaughter of animals raised for food 
purposes, and did nothing to prevent cruelty to animals unrelated to religious practices.  Id. 
124 See supra notes 32-56, 113-23 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 38. 
126 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text. 
128 See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. 
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either.129  Therefore, states do not have to enact laws like Illinois’s 
emergency rule in order to protect patients’ constitutional rights.130  
Although a state may be able to enact a law like Illinois’s without 
violating a pharmacist’s freedom of religion, a state should treat 
pharmacists’ beliefs with respect, especially because there are 
alternatives to duty-to-dispense legislation that would still provide 
patients with adequate access to medications.131  In fact, from a policy 
standpoint, duty-to-dispense legislation has some negative consequences 
that may seriously undermine its effectiveness and its desirability.132  
Part III.A explains why the patient’s rights are not infringed by a 
pharmacist’s refusal to dispense emergency contraception or other drugs 
to which pharmacists may be morally opposed.133  Part III.B then 
explains why pharmacists’ beliefs should be respected and protected, 
even though states may be able to constitutionally enact duty-to-
dispense legislation.134  Part III.C discusses alternatives to duty-to-
dispense legislation and the policy considerations that favor use of those 
alternatives.135  Finally, Part III.D discusses the benefits of conscience 
clause legislation.136 
A. Patients’ Rights Are Not Infringed by Pharmacist Refusal To Dispense 
Supreme Court precedent indicates that patients’ rights are not 
infringed by pharmacists’ refusal to dispense.137  The Supreme Court has 
made clear through its abortion funding cases, such as Beal v. Doe and 
Maher v. Roe, that the government is only required to avoid unduly 
burdening the right to an abortion; it is not required to take affirmative 
steps to make abortions available or easier to access.138  Although the 
scope of the right to contraception is broader, there is no indication that 
this right creates any duties either; in general, the Court has not required 
the government to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights.139  
                                                 
129 See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.  Although emergency contraception 
might be analyzed under the Court’s contraception precedent instead, the outcome 
probably would not be different.  See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
130 See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. 
131 See infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text. 
132 See infra notes 214-47 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text. 
134 See infra notes 155-204 and accompanying text. 
135 See infra notes 205-47 and accompanying text. 
136 See infra notes 248-62 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s abortion 
and contraception precedents). 
138 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (explaining the holdings of Beal v. Doe 
and Maher v. Roe). 
139 Supra note 56.  The main exception is for rights related to access to the courts.  Id. 
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Furthermore, the Constitution constrains only the government, and does 
not generally constrain individuals or business entities.140  In the few 
cases in which the Court has held that a constitutional right imposed a 
duty upon a third party, that third party has always been the 
government.141  It would be quite anomalous if the Court, upon hearing a 
case that presented the issue, would hold that the right to abortion or 
contraception created a duty for professionals.142  A woman’s right to use 
emergency contraception does not include a right to obtain that product 
from a particular source, regardless of whether emergency contraception 
is considered contraception or abortion.143  
Some commentators have argued that pharmacists should be 
required to dispense emergency contraception because some poor 
women, particularly those in rural areas, may only have access to one 
pharmacy or a few pharmacies.144  However, the fact that some women 
may not be able to access emergency contraception in a timely manner is 
not a reason for a blanket rule requiring all pharmacists to dispense 
emergency contraception in all situations.145  The problem of poor rural 
                                                 
140 See supra note 53. 
141 See supra note 56. 
142 See supra note 56. 
143 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
144 See Julia Lichtman, Note, Restrictive State Abortion Laws: Today’s Most Powerful 
Conscience Clause, 10 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y. 345 (1997); Teliska, supra note 33. 
145 The Governor of Illinois did not promulgate his rule in response to large numbers of 
women being able to obtain emergency contraception, but on the basis of two complaints of 
pharmacists refusing to fill prescriptions in downtown Chicago.  Hearing, supra note 5, at 7 
(statement of Sheila Nix).  In fact, several women who have filed complaints have 
acknowledged that they could have easily obtained their prescription if they had waited a 
few hours or went to another nearby pharmacy.  Id. (statement of Sheila Nix); id at 35 
(statement of Megan Kelly, an Illinois resident who experienced a pharmacist refusal).  
Women who are intentionally driving out of their way to test small pharmacies in remote 
areas are generating some of these refusals.  Id. at 9 (statement of J. Michael Patton, Ill. 
Pharmacists Assoc.).  Not only are actual refusals rare, but it appears that the overall 
demand for emergency contraception is low in Illinois, particularly in rural areas.  See id. 
(statement of J. Michael Patton) (noting that one pharmacy has only had two requests for 
emergency contraception in five years); id. at 28 (statement of Luke Vander Bleek) (stating 
that his chain of pharmacies dealt with 15,000 different patients in the past year, but has 
only received two requests for emergency contraception in the past two years).  
Pharmacists in small rural towns have found that demand for emergency contraception is 
particularly low because women actually prefer to go out of town to have their 
prescriptions filled in order to better protect their privacy.  Id. at 9 (statement of J. Michael 
Patton).  On a nationwide level, refusals also seem to be a statistically minor problem.  Id. at 
67 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean).  MacLean stated: 
[N]early 3.3 billion prescriptions are dispensed each year in the 
outpatient setting, and averaging about 9 million prescriptions per 
day.  Proponents of “duty to fill” laws document approximately 
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women who would otherwise be able to obtain emergency 
contraception, but cannot solely because the nearest pharmacist refuses 
to dispense it, appears to be statistically small and therefore does not 
warrant a rule of the breadth similar to the one in force in Illinois.146  
Rather, it appears that the rule would function more often than not to 
serve the customer’s convenience rather than need.147  As discussed 
above, a pharmacist’s refusal to dispense would not violate a woman’s 
constitutional rights.148  Therefore, states should consider whether there 
are ways to increase poor women’s access to emergency contraception 
that do not compromise pharmacists’ beliefs.149 
The Supreme Court’s decisions upholding regulations of abortion, 
such as Casey, also demonstrate that the right to an abortion is not 
                                                                                                             
twelve examples of refusals to fill since 1996.  One must question the 
need for new laws or regulations to address a handful of situations 
that may have been avoided through better communication and 
alternative systems. 
Id. at 67-68.  If patients are in fact being treated poorly by pharmacists, there is no particular 
reason to believe that market forces will not take care of it: 
Decisions about what services to provide and by whom should be left 
up to individual health care providers.  Decisions about which systems 
to implement and how to implement them should be left up to 
pharmacy managers and pharmacists.  Patients will choose the 
pharmacy and pharmacists who best serve their needs, and market 
forces will dictate what services the pharmacies provide. 
Id. at 67.  As in Illinois, nationwide demand for emergency contraception appears to be 
very low.  WHEELAND, supra note 31, at 11.  Wheeland states: 
[The Alan Guttmacher Institute’s] Contraceptive Use study found that 
[emergency contraception] had been used by only 3% of women who 
had experienced condom breakage, 2% of inconsistent condom users, 
and 1% of inconsistent pill users.  Since [emergency contraception] is 
promoted primarily for a “contraceptive accident,” such low rates of . . 
. usage for that purpose appear to call into question the true 
importance of [emergency contraception] for “contraceptive failure.” 
Id.  Pro-choice organizations’ representations concerning the demand for emergency 
contraception have not always been completely neutral since a number of them, including 
Planned Parenthood affiliates, founded the Women’s Capital Corporation, the for-profit 
corporation that is the original manufacturer of Plan B.  Id. at 5.  The corporation was sold 
to Barr Laboratories in 2003, but not before these organizations launched a very organized 
campaign to generate a market for emergency contraception, including application for 
over-the-counter status.  Id. at 5, 8-9. 
146 See supra note 145.  One must also consider that in the case of a woman who is too 
poor to travel to visit a pharmacy, the fact that the nearest pharmacist is a conscientious 
objector may not be the proximate cause of her inability to obtain emergency contraception.  
A woman at that income level may be unable to afford to see a doctor to get a prescription 
in the first place, or she may be unable to pay for the drugs themselves. 
147 See supra notes 145-46. 
148 See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. 
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violated just because a woman seeking an abortion encounters people 
who disagree with her choice.150  For example, under Casey, a state may 
adopt a policy encouraging childbirth and, pursuant to that policy, 
require women to be presented with certain information before she 
obtains an abortion, although she may be wholly in disagreement with 
that policy.151  Whatever burden may be placed on women by hearing 
pharmacists say that they will not distribute emergency contraception 
because they are morally opposed to it does not constitute a violation of 
women’s rights to abortion.152  The experience may be unpleasant or 
inconvenient for the patient, but a patient’s dislike for a pharmacist’s 
views is not a strong enough basis for limiting the pharmacist’s ability to 
express or act in accordance with his or her views.153  In the United 
States, viewpoints are not suppressed merely because they are 
unpleasant to the audience.154 
B. Pharmacists’ Beliefs Are Entitled to Respect 
While duty-to-dispense legislation is not necessary in order to 
protect patients’ rights, it is possible that a state could draft a law 
requiring pharmacists to dispense drugs that would not be in violation 
of First Amendment rights.155  It is questionable whether a law like the 
Illinois emergency rule is permissible under the Supreme Court’s Free 
Exercise precedent.156  Because the Illinois emergency rule only applies to 
                                                 
150 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing Casey and other precedents 
permitting regulation of abortion). 
151 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
152 Again, contraception precedent may be the precedent that is actually applied to 
emergency contraception, but it is not clear that it would make a difference.  See supra notes 
53–56 and accompanying text.  While the government is not allowed to prohibit the use of 
contraception, it does not necessarily follow that the government is not allowed to express 
its opinion about contraception.  In fact, governmental bodies often do just that, for 
example, through school sexual education programs.  There is no clear reason why the 
government would be allowed to express an opinion on contraception, but a pharmacist or 
pharmacy would not. 
153 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 748 (1990).  “Although the Government, 
within certain limits, may protect captive listeners against unwelcome intrusions, in public 
locations ‘we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear.’”  Id. 
154 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (“The plain, if at times 
disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society . . . ‘we are inescapably captive audiences 
for many purposes.’  Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and 
moral, sensibilities. . . . the burden normally falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid further 
bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.’”) (internal citations 
omitted); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 
21-22 (1971). 
155 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
156 Id.  The standard is whether the rule is a generally applicable law under Smith and 
Hialeah.  See supra notes 114-23. 
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contraception (defined to include emergency contraception), the rule 
primarily controls the behavior of pharmacists who believe that life 
begins at some point before implantation.157  The rule was admittedly 
enacted in response to pharmacists refusing to dispense emergency 
contraception because of moral concerns.158  The impetus for the rule was 
reports of two prescriptions for emergency contraception that were not 
filled because of conscientious objections.159  In both cases, the patient 
was asked to call back a few hours later when a different pharmacist was 
on duty.160  Therefore, state officials were not responding to patients’ 
inability to obtain emergency contraception, but to the pharmacists’ 
beliefs.  While the rule is neutral on its face, like the ordinance in Lukumi, 
it was enacted in response to a particular practice and was narrowly 
constructed to target that practice.161  Therefore, it should not be 
considered a generally applicable law.162   
The rule’s limited scope not only makes the targeted beliefs 
identifiable, but also weakens the state’s justification.163  It would be 
difficult for the state to argue that it has a compelling interest in 
providing access to prescription drugs in a timely manner when it has 
only chosen to regulate contraception.164  Time will often be of the 
essence in obtaining drugs, yet the state has only created a duty to 
dispense contraception, and only in retail pharmacies.165  Like the 
ordinance in Lukumi, the narrow application of the Illinois rule seems to 
belie its facial neutrality.166  While the Illinois rule may not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny, a state could likely adopt a general policy of 
making drugs available to patients with valid prescriptions and require 
pharmacists to dispense drugs of any type.167  Such a law could be 
                                                 
157 See supra note 91. 
158 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra notes 120-23 (discussing the holding in Lukumi). 
163 See supra notes 120-23.  The law in Lukumi was also invalidated because its limited 
scope betrayed its purpose of targeting a particular belief.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535-36. 
164 See supra note 91. 
165 See supra note 91.  One reason that advocates of the duty-to-dispense legislation have 
insisted that this legislation is necessary is because emergency contraception has sometimes 
been used to stop severe hemorrhaging.  See Hearing, supra note 5, at 29.  It seems much 
more likely that a severely hemorrhaging patient would be seeking the services of a 
hospital than a retail pharmacy.  Yet the Illinois rule does not apply to hospitals or any 
medications other than contraception.  See supra note 91. 
166 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra notes 113-23.  The law would have to be facially neutral and not target any 
particular belief.  Id. 
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considered a generally applicable law that does not target any particular 
belief.168 
Although a state may be able to devise a law that would require 
pharmacists to dispense drugs to which they are morally opposed 
without necessarily violating their First Amendment rights, a state 
should not force pharmacists to act against their consciences if there are 
other ways to achieve the state’s goals.169  Because states do not have to 
require pharmacists to dispense drugs in order to protect the patients’ 
constitutional rights, states should make an effort to provide access to 
drugs without compromising pharmacists’ beliefs.170   
Part of the debate over the rights and duties of pharmacists is how 
the role of pharmacists is characterized.171  Pharmacists are the most 
accessible members of the health care community.172  Therefore, some 
critics view pharmacists as playing too important a role to be given 
rights of conscience that would allow them to refuse certain 
prescriptions.173  However, as explained above, a patient’s rights are not 
infringed by a pharmacist’s refusal.174  Furthermore, there are alternative 
methods for providing adequate and timely access to drugs.175   
On the other hand, others view pharmacists as order takers, who 
should not have or expect any discretion.176  Under this view, doctors 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean).  Describing a 
combination of the alternatives discussed below in Part III.C, MacLean states that “[o]ne 
individual’s rights should not outweigh another’s.  Our policy balances the needs of the 
patient and the individual needs and duties of the pharmacist.  Implemented well, patients 
receive care and pharmacists are not–will not be forced to ignore their personal beliefs.”  Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See Teliska, supra note 33 (arguing that pharmacists should not be allowed to refuse to 
dispense because poor women may have a difficult time obtaining access to emergency 
contraception); Friedman, supra note 22 (stating that pharmacists “serve on the frontlines of 
the health care system”); cf. Hearing, supra note 5, at 14 (statement of Megan Kelly) 
(asserting that pharmacists who do not dispense are interfering with the doctor-patient 
relationship); see id. at 65 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean) (stating that proposals for 
duty-to-dispense legislation portray pharmacists as “robots” or “automatons”). 
172 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
173 See Teliska, supra note 33; Friedman, supra note 22. 
174 See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. 
175 Alternatives are discussed below in Part III.C.  See infra notes 205-13. 
176 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 65 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean) (describing the 
clinical role of the pharmacist versus the robot-like function sometimes portrayed in the 
media and recent legislative proposals). 
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play the most important role.177  However, doctors in most jurisdictions 
are given rights of conscience.178  If doctors, who bear the greatest 
responsibility in the chain of medical care, enjoy special protections, 
those who merely play an ancillary role should enjoy them as well.179  If 
there is a strong enough justification for allowing the most responsible 
members of the medical community to refuse services, that justification 
should be strong enough to release those health care providers with 
lesser responsibility.180  Pharmacists, like doctors, enter the field of 
medicine to heal and not harm.181  Therefore, they should also have a 
right to refuse to participate in procedures that they believe are 
harmful.182  A pharmacist who is morally opposed to emergency 
contraception, for example, is concerned about potential harm to an 
unborn child.183  While the pharmacist is not being asked to participate in 
the actual physical act of harm, a pharmacist may still believe that it is 
wrong to provide the means by which harm is accomplished.184  The 
distinction between participation and enabling is not a distinction that 
everyone finds meaningful.185 
                                                 
177 Id. at 14 (statement of Megan Kelly).  Some view pharmacist refusals as an interference 
with the doctor and patient’s collaborative decision of what is medically appropriate for 
the patient.  Id.  However, from the pharmacist’s perspective, duty-to-fill legislation requires 
pharmacists to be involved in the doctor-patient relationship.  See id. at 20 (statement of 
Luke Vander Bleek).  Mr. Vander Bleek states: 
With respect to the contention that somehow I am inserting myself in a 
patient-physician relationship, nothing could be further from the truth.  
Indeed, what I am requesting here, [is for the] government to stop 
trying to pull me into that relationship. . . .  They have their 
relationship.  I don’t want to be involved in products that might 
endanger human life, and I request that I can still own a pharmacy, a 
small business in the State of Illinois and be excerpted from that 
requirement that I need to be pulled into that particular relationship. 
Id. 
178 See supra note 38. 
179 This notion is already acknowledged by some states, which have more comprehensive 
conscience clauses.  See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 70/3(c) (2004) (granting rights of 
conscience to nurses, nurse’s aids, and medical students, among others); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
41-107-3 (2005) (granting rights of conscience to physician’s assistants, nurses, nurse’s aids, 
and pharmacists, among others). 
180 Particularly in the case of emergency contraception, a conscientious objector is 
concerned about potential harm to a human life in the form of an embryo.  Pharmacists, 
like doctors, have a right to assert a beneficent refusal.  See Allen & Brushwood, supra note 
10, at 6. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 See infra note 224. 
184 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Luke Vander Bleek). 
185 See id. 
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Pharmacist refusals might be viewed as an interference with the 
doctor and patient’s collaborative decision of what is medically 
appropriate for the patient.186  However, the pharmacist is not 
substituting his or her judgment for the doctor’s; rather, the pharmacist 
simply does not wish to be a participant in that decision.187  The doctor 
may be the one who has consulted with the patient, examined her, and 
evaluated her medical history.188  Nevertheless, the doctor’s right to 
refuse to prescribe emergency contraception exists independently of this 
knowledge.189  A doctor may refuse to prescribe emergency 
contraception solely on the basis of a conscientious objection, even when 
the prescription would be medically appropriate.190  Therefore, the 
source of the right of conscience is not the doctor’s special knowledge or 
training.191  If the doctor may exercise the right of conscience 
independent of any knowledge of what is medically appropriate for the 
patient, then a lack of such knowledge should not serve as a barrier to 
pharmacists possessing the same rights of conscience.192    
One might also argue that pharmacists are licensed by the states and 
should submit to any conditions on the practice of pharmacy that the 
states might wish to impose, including a duty to dispense particular 
drugs.193  However, doctors are also licensed by the states, and almost 
every state has chosen to give doctors rights of conscience.194  Once 
again, there is no clear reason to treat pharmacists differently.195  The 
decision to practice pharmacy does not signify an acquiescence to 
participate in any and every medical decision involving a prescription, 
since pharmacies generally do not carry all drugs in the first place.196  
                                                 
186 See supra note 177. 
187 See supra note 177. 
188 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 33-34 (statements of Rep. Donald Manzullo and Sheila 
Nix) (discussing that a doctor could refuse to prescribe emergency contraception solely on 
conscientious grounds and regardless of any information revealed in consulting with and 
examining the patient). 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 Id. 
192 See id. 
193 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra note 38 (surveying state conscience clauses). 
195 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. 
196 Even large chain pharmacies like Wal-Mart do not carry all prescription medications.  
Women Sue Wal-Mart, supra note 6.  Furthermore, the scope of a business is an elusive 
concept.  See Hearing, supra note 5, at 31 (statement of Rep. Steve King).  Representative 
King stated: 
You can take this same philosophy [that pharmacies must dispense 
emergency contraception because it is in their line of business] and you 
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The logical scope of a pharmacist’s practice, therefore, does not 
necessarily include dispensing all medications.197    
Moreover, the belief that emergency contraception is abortion is 
entitled to respect.198  There is no conclusive scientific method of 
determining when life begins, and because the Supreme Court has 
declined to make a judgment call about what constitutes the beginning 
of life, its precedent has centered on balancing rights.199  However, the 
beginning of life is what is really at the heart of the abortion 
controversy.200  If the beginning of life could be conclusively determined, 
the difference between abortion and the taking of a life would be clear, 
and a large part of the abortion controversy could be resolved.201  
                                                                                                             
can extrapolate this on point after point after point.  Anyone who can 
establish the political power and the leverage to move forward with 
this kind of philosophy and set aside a conscience protection …. 
You could require bookstores to carry pornography; you could require 
all retail establishments . . . to carry Lotto cards and any other kind of 
gambling equipment there is; you could require anyone who sold soft 
drinks to also sell alcohol; you could require the pharmacist to sell 
euthanasia/suicide drugs; you could require doctors to perform 
abortions, all under this same philosophy. 
Id.  Sheila Nix, senior advisor to Governor Blagojevich, responded to this statement, saying: 
Well, pharmacies are in the business of providing prescription drugs.  I 
would say that a retail store that sells soft drinks is not in the business 
of providing alcohol, so there is a difference.  Class 1 retail pharmacies 
put themselves out there, they advertise that they fill prescriptions; 
and we are just saying if you advertise you fill prescriptions, you 
should fill the prescription. 
Id.  However, the scope of a business is an elusive concept; a given business can be 
described broadly as in Representative King’s statement, or narrowly as in Nix’s statement, 
and the difference between the two is arbitrary. 
197 See supra note 196. 
198 See supra note 169. 
199 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
200 In Illinois, for example, executives have tried to appear neutral by adopting the FDA 
definition of contraception, which includes traditional oral contraceptives as well as 
emergency contraception.  Hearing, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Sheila Nix).  However, 
this is tantamount to deciding that pregnancy begins at implantation and not at 
fertilization.  See id. at 26 (statements of Sheila Nix and Chairman Donald A. Manzullo).  
These state officials do not recognize that a pharmacist may have no moral objection to 
regular oral contraceptives, but still be opposed to emergency contraception.  See id. at 25-
26 (statements of Sheila Nix and Chairman Donald A. Manzullo).  Adopting the FDA 
definition of contraception glosses over the very thing that makes emergency contraception 
controversial.  See id. 
201 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.  For example, if there were a scientific 
experiment that could prove that life begins at implantation, then emergency contraception 
would not cause an abortion by anyone’s definition of the term.  While the drug might still 
be somewhat controversial, since some people are opposed to contraception in general, 
clearly a large part of the controversy would be resolved.  However, no such proof or 
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However, there is no such method, and the fact that the FDA and the 
AMA have defined pregnancy in such a way that emergency 
contraception is not abortion does not raise that policy decision to the 
level of scientific fact.202  Therefore, a pharmacist’s decision that life 
begins with fertilization should be afforded the same respect as a patient 
who believes life begins at some later point.203  Even if it could be 
conclusively stated that emergency contraception does not cause 
abortions, that fact would not ease the conscience of pharmacists who 
are morally opposed to contraception in general.204 
C. Alternatives to Duty-to-Dispense Legislation and Other Policy 
Considerations 
Because pharmacists’ beliefs are entitled to respect, states should 
look to alternatives to duty-to-dispense legislation to maintain adequate 
access to medications.205  Some pharmacies may be able to come up with 
a working system of their own, such as modifying pharmacists’ work 
schedules.206  In states where pharmacists are permitted to prescribe 
emergency contraception, women seeking this medication can go 
directly to pharmacists who have chosen to take part in this program.207  
When a patient seeks a prescription from a doctor, the doctor can refer 
the patient to pharmacists they know would be willing to fill the 
prescription.208  Another alternative would be for physicians to dispense 
the pills to patients themselves.209  A physician who is comfortable 
prescribing emergency contraception could also dispense the 
medication, and thus eliminate the possibility of the patient running into 
a pharmacist who is opposed to emergency contraception.210  
                                                                                                             
consensus exists, and thus, all beliefs should be respected.  See supra note 169 and 
accompanying text. 
202 Supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
203 The Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on the beginning of life indicates that differing 
viewpoints should be respected.  See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
204 Illinois pharmacists who are morally opposed to contraception in general may be 
exempt from the Illinois rule creating a duty to dispense.  See supra note 92.  However, this 
may still be a problem in other states that choose to enact duty-to-fill legislation. 
205 See supra note 169. 
206 Hearing, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean). 
207 Id. at 62-63 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean); see also supra note 30 (listing the 
states that have given pharmacists the authority to prescribe). 
208 Hearing, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean). 
209 Id. at 63 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean). 
210 Id.  MacLean, a Washington pharmacist, has found that a combination of pharmacist-
prescribing and physician-dispensing has effectively dealt with the demand for emergency 
contraception, even in rural areas of the state.  See id. at 37 (statements of Rep. Nydia 
Velazquez and Linda Garrelts MacLean).  Pro-choice advocates cite few examples of 
women being unable to obtain emergency contraception in a timely manner even after a 
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Additionally, emergency contraception is readily available at family 
planning centers.211  There is also a national hotline and a website that 
can give information to patients looking for a pharmacist who will 
dispense emergency contraception.212  With better communication, the 
situation in which a patient faces a pharmacist who does not wish to 
dispense the desired medication can be prevented.213 
There are several other policy reasons why these alternatives are 
better than a law creating a duty to dispense.214  First, pharmacies are 
businesses and need to be able to make individualized decisions that are 
appropriate for their business. 215  While a pharmacy may decide not to 
carry emergency contraception for moral reasons, it may also be a 
business decision.216  There may not be a high demand for emergency 
contraception among the pharmacy’s clientele, or stocking the drug 
might drive off other classes of clientele that the pharmacy wishes to 
attract.217  Laws like the Illinois emergency rule, which requires 
pharmacists to order emergency contraceptives if they do not have them 
in stock when a patient brings in a prescription, may not be an 
economically practical way for the pharmacy to deal with the 
                                                                                                             
pharmacist refusal.  See supra note 145.  The primary example is Neil Noesen, the Wisconsin 
pharmacist who not only refused to dispense, but also refused to transfer or return the 
patient’s prescription.  See supra note 67.  When pharmacists transfer the prescription or 
refer, women have generally been able to have their prescription filled within two hours or 
less.  See supra note 145. 
211 See Emergency Contraception, supra note 23.  Planned Parenthood is one of the 
leading providers of emergency contraception.  Id.  In 2004 alone, Planned Parenthood 
provided emergency contraception services to approximately 983,537 women.  Planned 
Parenthood Services, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/ 
medicalinfo/birthcontrol/fact-pp-services-2003.xml (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).  Planned 
Parenthood operates more than 850 clinics located in all states and the District of Columbia.  
Id.  Planned Parenthood is also very accessible to poor women.  The organization serves 
about 5,000,000 clients each year, approximately 74% of who have incomes at or below 
150% of the federal poverty line.  Planned Parenthood by the Numbers, http://www. 
plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/medicalinfo/birthcontrol/fact-pp-by-
numbers.xml (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). 
212 Hearing, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean).  The hotline is 1-
888-not-2-late, and the website is http://not-2-late.com.  Id. 
213 Id. 
214 See id. at 66-67 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean, Member, American Pharmacists 
Assoc.) (describing how duty-to-dispense legislation can impede a pharmacy’s ability to 
make good business decisions). 
215 See id.  MacLean states: “[I]t is a reality that health care is a business, and pharmacy 
practice a component of that business.  ‘Duty to fill’ legislation affect business–and 
specifically small businesses—by dictating how a business must accommodate its staff, in 
this situation, its pharmacists.”  Id. at 66. 
216 Id. at 66-67. 
217 See supra note 145 (discussing the demand for emergency contraception). 
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situation.218  Pharmacies, like other businesses, exist to make a profit 
rather than to provide people access to their rights, and therefore need to 
be able to make decisions about which products they carry.219  When 
determining whether to carry a particular product, a business will 
consider the demand for that product and the segment of the market the 
business wishes to attract, the health plans they participate in, and the 
prescribing patterns of the physicians in the area.220  With about 10,000 
drugs currently on the market, most pharmacies can only afford to carry 
those drugs for which there is a demand.221  While a pharmacy may have 
to turn customers away if it chooses not to stock emergency 
contraception, if this drug is not in high demand among the pharmacy’s 
clientele, the costs of stocking or special ordering the drug can be more 
costly than turning away the few customers who want to purchase it.222  
Pharmacies should be able to decide what to stock based on their 
business judgment and moral inclinations.223  Moreoever, pharmacists 
should be able to incorporate moral decisions into the operation of their 
businesses because they are not discriminating against the patient; they 
are simply choosing not to be involved with the patient’s decisions and 
exercising their business judgment.224 
One aspect of pharmacies that makes them different from most other 
businesses is that customers must purchase prescription drugs from a 
                                                 
218 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 67.  Special ordering costs more, and may not arrive 
within a timely manner.  Id.  In such a case, it is normal for patients to be referred to other 
pharmacies.  Id. 
219 See id. at 66-67. 
220 Id. at 67. 
221 Id. at 66-67; see supra note 196. 
222 See supra note 145 (discussing the demand for emergency contraception). 
223 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 61 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean).  MacLean 
states: “Pharmacist services are a business.  Intruding on how and what I choose to provide 
my patients is an intrusion into how I run my small business.”  Id. 
224 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 20 (statement of Luke Vander Bleek).  Vander Bleek states: 
 I think it is interesting that some people might want to confuse 
my position and say I am discriminating against a class of people or a 
particular medical condition of people.  I am objecting to a medication 
and what that medication does. 
 I have regard for the third person in the relationship.  There is me.  
There is the expectant mother that comes in.  And there is the live child 
that I have to recognize has the possibility of existing, and that my 
involvement in dispensing this prescription is involvement in the 
extinguishing of that life. 
Id.  Some state conscience clauses specify that refusal must be based on personal moral 
beliefs rather than discriminatory reasons.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (2000); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-1 to 13 (2005). 
Yoder: Pharmacists' Right of Conscience:  Strategies for Showing Respect
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1016 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
pharmacist.225  In that sense, pharmacists play a “gate-keeping” role.226  
However, patients also need to obtain a prescription before purchasing 
prescription drugs from doctors, who in most states are given the rights 
of conscience.227  A conscientious refusal is not necessarily an 
abandonment of the patient; if pharmacists refer patients to another 
pharmacist or pharmacy who can fill the prescription in a timely 
manner, then they have still served the patient while preserving their 
own consciences.228  Pharmacists, who believe that they cannot, in good 
conscience, give a referral or transfer can at least return the prescription 
and direct the patient back to the doctor, who might then dispense the 
drug or provide a referral to a different pharmacy.229   
Nevertheless, some critics of conscience clause legislation believe it is 
unfair for pharmacists to refuse service since they are the only ones 
legally allowed to sell prescription medications.230  Licensing creates a 
barrier to new pharmacies entering the market; therefore, if a significant 
number of pharmacists choose not to dispense emergency contraception, 
they might substantially limit consumers’ ability to enjoy their 
constitutional rights.231  However, the business aspect of pharmacies 
cannot be ignored.  Compliance with duty-to-fill legislation is not 
without its costs.232  In Illinois, for example, a pharmacy that does not 
                                                 
225 See Teliska, supra note 33, at 247. 
226 See id. 
227 See supra note 38 (surveying state conscience clauses).  Plan B is now available to 
adults over-the-counter; however, minors still need a prescription.  Ritter, supra note 31. 
228 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 32 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean).  MacLean, 
describing how she has seen this work, states: 
[I]f a pharmacist must step away because of a conscience clause, that 
pharmacist still has the obligation to ensure that a woman gets what 
she needs. 
What I can tell you is, that is what I see day in and day out.  Whether it 
is because we don’t have this particular expensive drug on the shelf, if 
it is emergent, and that patient needs a drug, I can call five pharmacies 
and transfer the prescription.  I can ensure I have taken care of that 
patient. . . . If it is not emergent, we can decide on what the best route 
is. 
Id. 
229 See id. at 62-63 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean) (describing how pharmacists 
can exercise their rights of conscience while still serving the patient). 
230 See Teliska, supra note 33, at 247. 
231 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 37 (statement of Rep. Nydia Velazquez) (raising the 
question of what would happen if all pharmacists in a particular area decided not to 
dispense a medication). 
232 See id. at 10 (statement of J. Michael Patton, Ill. Pharmacists Assoc.) (describing how 
some pharmacies are questioning the viability of continuing to operate in Illinois as a result 
of the rule requiring them to dispense emergency contraception). 
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want to sell emergency contraception must forgo selling any kind of 
contraception.233  A pharmacy that is willing to sell emergency 
contraception, but wishes to accommodate the beliefs of its individual 
pharmacists has to make sure that a pharmacist that can fill prescriptions 
for emergency contraception is on duty or on call at all times.234  When a 
pharmacy has decided to accommodate the conscientious objections of 
its pharmacists, or to not carry emergency contraception at all, it 
necessarily has accepted that it will turn away some business.235  At that 
point, the pharmacy needs to do what it can to cut its losses; a rule like 
the one in force in Illinois does not give businesses that flexibility.236   
The Illinois rule also requires pharmacists to order emergency 
contraception if it is not in stock and a patient demands it.237  In some 
areas, the demand for emergency contraception is very low, and 
pharmacies in that area will not want to stock it on a regular basis.238  
Meeting the requirement to stock emergency contraception at the 
demand of the patient may be costly for a small pharmacy.239  All these 
procedures can be prohibitively expensive for pharmacies and may drive 
them out of business or out of state.240  If legislatures do not consider the 
economic impact of duty-to-fill legislation on pharmacies, they may 
unintentionally decrease the number of operating pharmacies, along 
with access to emergency contraception and other medications.241   
There are several other potential unintended consequences of duty-
to-fill legislation.  Such legislation may decrease access to emergency 
contraception by encouraging pharmacies not to stock the drugs at all in 
the hope that women will prefer to be transferred or will no longer need 
                                                 
233 See supra note 92. 
234 See supra note 92. 
235 As businesses, pharmacies should be free to make this choice.  See supra note 214.  If 
patients dislike how they are treated by these pharmacies, they will go elsewhere, and the 
market will adjust to their demands.  See supra note 145. 
236 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. 
237 See supra note 92. 
238 See supra note 145. 
239 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 10 (statement of J. Michael Patton) (describing how some 
pharmacists are questioning the viability of continuing to practice in Illinois); id. at 67 
(statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean) (describing the cost implications of special-ordering 
medications). 
240 See id. 
241 See id.  Some small towns are served by a single pharmacy.  See Hearing, supra note 5, 
at 25.  If the only pharmacist in the town exits the market because of conscience concerns, 
the town may have difficulty attracting a new pharmacy.  See supra note 97. 
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the medication by the time they can get it in stock.242  Some pharmacies 
that are willing to sell emergency contraception, but wish to 
accommodate the individual beliefs of their pharmacists, may have to set 
aside their own working policies in order to conform to state law.243  
Finally, poorly crafted laws may interfere with pharmacists’ other 
duties.244  The Illinois emergency rule, for example, requires that 
pharmacies must dispense emergency contraception “without delay.”245  
However, pharmacists have a duty to screen for drug-drug interactions, 
drug-food interactions, drug-allergy interactions, incorrect dosage, 
incorrect duration, and clinical abuse or misuse, all of which naturally 
involve some “delay.”246  While the rule was amended to clarify that 
pharmacists were not expected to curtail these responsibilities or give 
patients seeking emergency contraception any sort of preferential or 
expedited treatment, this is still a potential pitfall for other legislatures 
considering enacting duty-to-fill legislation.247 
D. The Benefits of Conscience Clause Legislation 
Enacting legislation that affords pharmacists rights of conscience will 
give the beliefs of pharmacists the respect they deserve; however, 
clarification of pharmacists’ rights and responsibilities will benefit all 
parties involved.248  Pharmacists are professionals who are expected to 
live up to certain standards.249  In order to do that, they need to know 
what actions they can take without risking discrimination, discipline, or 
civil liability.  Patients will also know what they can and cannot expect 
from pharmacists.250  Because there are realistic concerns that 
conscientious objectors could be vulnerable to civil liability, disciplinary 
                                                 
242 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 68 (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean, Member, 
American Pharmacists Assoc.) (explaining that not stocking emergency contraception may 
be the only way a pharmacy can avoid the situation of forcing their pharmacists to 
dispense). 
243 See id. 
244 Id. at 65. 
245 See supra note 92.  The rule had to be amended subsequently to clarify that the rule 
was not intended to interfere with a pharmacist’s duty to screen for potential problems 
including duplication, drug-drug or drug-food interactions, or incorrect dosage or 
duration. 
246 See supra note 92. 
247 See supra note 92. 
248 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 14, 30 (statements of Megan Kelly and Rep. Steve King).  
While the right to abortion and contraception probably does not impose affirmative duties 
on health care professionals, patients may nonetheless perceive that it does, and therefore 
may be upset by a refusal even when it is done politely and professionally.  Id. 
249 See supra notes 58-61. 
250 See supra note 248. 
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action, and employment discrimination, a conscience clause that clearly 
lays out a pharmacist’s rights and responsibilities would be the most 
reliable form of protection.251  Protections under Title VII are particularly 
weak, since the employer only needs to establish that accomodation of 
the employee’s beliefs involve more than a de minimis cost.252  In a 
pharmacy, there may be certain shifts where only one pharmacist is 
needed.253  Arranging the schedule so that a conscientious objector never 
works the single shift could result in lower morale and disruption of 
established work schedules, which are undue burdens under Brener.254  
Additionally, although when more than one pharmacist is on duty, 
objectionable prescriptions could be handled by one of the other 
pharmacists, co-workers likely would resent having to handle all the 
objectionable prescriptions for the conscientious objector, especially since 
these prescriptions are likely to be technically challenging.255  This policy 
would also lower morale and likely amount to an undue burden under 
Brener.256 
Although forty-six states have some type of conscience clause, it is 
not clear that these statutes will be applied to pharmacists or to 
emergency contraception.257  In the states that do not explicitly protect 
pharmacists, courts may or may not construe the conscience clause to 
protect them.258  These conscience clauses may contain catch-all 
provisions that a pharmacist could logically fit into, but it will ultimately 
be up to judges to determine whether pharmacists should be or were 
intended to fit into these provisions.259  Likewise, in the thirty-four states 
that have conscience clauses that only apply to abortion, it is not clear 
                                                 
251 See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text. 
252 Allen & Brushwood, supra note 10, at 8; Herbe, supra note 24, at 94. 
253 Herbe, supra note 24, at 94. 
254 See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 1982). 
255 Allen & Brushwood, supra note 10, at 8. 
Pharmacists tend to be impatient with colleagues who find other 
things to do when technically or therapeutically challenging 
prescriptions are presented.  The colleague who passes off to others the 
prescriptions for medications that are difficult to compound, or for 
medications that are being used in a novel ways [sic] that are difficult 
to understand and evaluate, will be seen as a slacker who is failing to 
meet a responsibility to co-workers.  The morally challenging 
prescription is likewise one that can breed resentment among 
colleagues when a pharmacist seeks to avoid it. 
Id. 
256 Id. 
257 See State Policies in Brief, supra note 7. 
258 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
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that the clauses will be applied to emergency contraception since the 
determination of whether emergency contraception causes abortion 
depends on the definition of when pregnancy begins.260  If a state adopts 
legislation based on the alternatives suggested above, both the 
pharmacist and the patient can avoid the uncomfortable situation that 
occurs when their beliefs conflict.261 
IV.  PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
The justifications for giving doctors rights of conscience are similar 
to the arguments in favor of granting rights of conscience to 
pharmacists.262  Because pharmacists and doctors are similarly situated, 
they should be granted similar rights of conscience.263  This goal can in 
some cases be achieved through amendments to existing conscience 
clauses.  However, in other cases, simply inserting pharmacists and 
pharmacies may fail to provide the clarification that is necessary.  In such 
a case, a statute such as the following could be enacted: 
Section 1.  Rights of Conscience for Pharmacists 
(a) No pharmacist is required to dispense medications to 
which he or she has a conscientious objection.  A 
conscientious objection exists when dispensing a 
drug would conflict with the pharmacist’s religious, 
moral, or ethical principles.  This section shall not be 
construed to permit a pharmacist to refuse to serve a 
patient because of the patient’s race, color, national 
origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed, or sexual 
orientation. 
(b) Employee pharmacists must notify their 
employers in writing of any objections before the 
right of conscience may be exercised. 
(c) A pharmacist who declines to fill a lawful prescription 
that is not otherwise contraindicated shall take one of the 
following actions: 
(i) refer the patient to another pharmacist, 
(ii) transfer the prescription to another pharmacy, or 
(iii) return the prescription to the patient and refer 
the patient back to the patient’s physician.    
                                                 
260 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra notes 171-97 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 171-97 and accompanying text. 
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(d) No pharmacist shall be held civilly liable for exercising 
the right of conscience if he or she has complied with 
sections (b) and (c).  Exercise of the right of conscience 
shall not be the basis of any disciplinary or administrative 
action against a pharmacist who has complied with 
sections (b) and (c). 
(e) No employer may discriminate against an employee 
pharmacist because of his or her conscientious objections.  
Discrimination includes, but is not limited to, 
refusing to hire, terminating employment, or 
otherwise to discriminating against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment. 
(f) A civil action for damages or injunctive relief, or 
both, may be brought for the violation of any of the 
provisions of this section. 
Section 2.  Rights of Conscience for Pharmacies 
(a) No pharmacy shall be required to stock or sell any 
medication to which its owners or other persons entitled 
to make business decisions for the pharmacy have a 
conscientious objection.  A conscientious objection exists 
when stocking or selling a drug would conflict with the 
owners’ or decision-makers’ religious, moral, or ethical 
principles.  This section shall not be construed to permit a 
pharmacist to refuse to serve a patient because of the 
patient’s race, color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, 
religion, creed, or sexual orientation. 
(b) No pharmacy shall be held civilly liable for exercising 
the right of conscience.  Exercise of the right of 
conscience shall not be the basis of any disciplinary 
or administrative action against a pharmacy.  No 
pharmacy shall be liable for its employees who 
exercise their rights of conscience and have 
complied with sections (1)(b) and (1)(c).  
(c) A civil action for damages or injunctive relief, or 
both, may be brought for the violation of any of the 
provisions of this section.264 
                                                 
264 Portions of the model statute appearing in italics are the author’s own words.  Non-
italicized portions are based upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-12-
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One of the primary goals of this proposed statute is clarification of 
rights, responsibilities, and clear definitions.  One issue that is clarified in 
the proposed statute is that both pharmacists and pharmacies are 
covered, and the statute explains how the right of conscience applies to 
each.265  While rights of conscience are important to pharmacists as 
individuals, they are also important to pharmacists as business 
owners.266  Pharmacy owners may have both ethical and economical 
concerns about providing certain medications, so rights of conscience are 
also important to pharmacies.267  Providing rights of conscience to 
pharmacies is akin to providing those rights to hospitals.268 
Another issue that is clarified by this proposed statute is that 
objections need not be based on religion.  A few states limit the 
application of their conscience clauses to religious institutions; however, 
requiring a religious basis for an objection confuses rather than clarifies 
rights and responsibilities. 269  If this sort of requirement is imposed on 
individuals, the government is put in the position of defining which 
objections are sufficiently “religious” to merit exemption.270  If a person 
has ethical objections to a medication, it should not matter whether that 
objection is based on any religious considerations.  Applying the religion 
requirement to institutions is also problematic as it is not always clear 
whether an institution is religious.271  Even if it is clear that an institution 
is religiously affiliated, it may not be clear whether the desire to refuse a 
service is based on that religious affiliation.272 
                                                                                                             
142 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(h), 5(1), 11(1); and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 
(2004). 
265 See supra notes 90-112 and accompanying text (describing how existing conscience 
clauses apply to pharmacies versus pharmacists). 
266 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 4-6 (statement of Luke Vander Bleek). 
267 Id. 
268 Forty-three states allow hospitals to choose not to provide abortion services.  State 
Policies in Brief, supra note 7.  Fifteen of these states only exempt private hospitals, and one 
(California) only exempts religiously affiliated hospitals.  Id.  Ten states allow hospitals to 
choose not to provide contraception.  Id.  Six of these states only exempt private hospitals, 
and one (Virginia) only exempts religiously affiliated hospitals.  Id. 
269 California exempts individuals and religious institutions from providing abortion 
services.  Id.  Virginia exempts individuals and institutions from providing abortion 
services, but only exempts religious institutions from providing contraception.  Id. 
270 For example, see the Supreme Court’s struggle to define “religious training and 
belief” in relation to the Selective Service Act in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
271 See Pellegrino, supra note 8, at 235-38 (describing conscience issues for religiously-
affiliated hospitals). 
272 Id. 
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While the objection need not be based on religious beliefs, it must be 
based on conscientious considerations rather than the pharmacist’s 
feelings about the patient.  The proposed statute prohibits the 
pharmacist from refusing to dispense based on the patient’s race, color, 
national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed, or sexual orientation.  
Therefore, a pharmacist could not, for example, use this statute to refuse 
to dispense retroviral medications to an HIV-infected patient based on 
the assumption that the patient is homosexual. 
This proposed statute also avoids the unnecessary confusion of 
whether emergency contraception is contraception or abortion, following 
the example of states that have conscience clauses that apply broadly to 
all medications.273  The additional advantage to this approach is that it 
also allows for the fact that there may be new medications in the future 
that create controversy.274  A primary reason to create conscience clause 
legislation is to clarify to pharmacists, pharmacies, and patients what 
their rights are.275  If the conscience clause only deals with medications 
that are currently in existence, those rights will be thrown into confusion 
again as soon as new controversies arise.   
Another issue that is resolved by the proposed statute is what 
pharmacists and pharmacies must do to bring themselves under the 
protection of the legislation and to satisfy their professional duties.  
Specifically, the proposed statute requires employees to notify their 
employers of their objections.276  This requirement should help 
pharmacies to better anticipate and plan for potential problems.  The 
statute also embraces the APhA view that pharmacists who exercise their 
rights of conscience should still cooperate with patients so that they can 
have their prescriptions filled by another pharmacist.277  The statute 
                                                 
273 See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1-70/14 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-1 to 13 (2005); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.065 (West 1999). 
274 See supra notes 10, 102-03 and accompanying text. 
275 See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text. 
276 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142(b) (2006) for an example of a law requiring notice. 
277 Hearing, supra note 5, at 61.  The APhA’s policy is as follows: 
APhA recognizes the individual pharmacist’s right to exercise 
conscientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems to 
ensure [the] patient’s access to legally prescribed therapy without 
compromising the pharmacist’s right of conscientious refusal. 
APhA’s policy supports the ability of a pharmacist to opt out of 
dispensing a prescription or providing a service for personal reasons 
and also supports the establishment of systems so that the patient’s 
access to appropriate health care is not disrupted.  In sum, our policy 
supports a pharmacist ‘stepping away’ from participating but not 
‘stepping in the way’ of the patient accessing the therapy. 
Yoder: Pharmacists' Right of Conscience:  Strategies for Showing Respect
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1024 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
requires pharmacists to refer the patient to another pharmacist, transfer 
the prescription to another pharmacy, or return the prescription to the 
patient with a referral back to the patient’s physician.  The physician 
could then dispense the medication or refer the patient to another 
pharmacy.  While some pharmacists may believe that they are still 
involved with the patient’s choice if they take these actions, pharmacists 
should recognize that they may not control the patient’s choices.278  
Rather, pharmacists should have the right to not be directly involved in 
providing medications to which they are morally opposed, but should 
not be allowed to control what patients do after they leave that particular 
pharmacy.279  Therefore, requiring pharmacists to at least return the 
prescription with a referral to the physician is a reasonable limitation on 
the right of conscience that will help keep patients’ options from 
becoming too restricted. 
The proposed statute resolves the three areas in which conflict may 
arise when a pharmacist wishes to exercise a right of conscience:  civil 
liability, employment discrimination, and disciplinary action.280  The 
statute explains how pharmacists and pharmacies are protected in each 
of these situations.  A right of conscience means very little if pharmacists 
and pharmacies may nonetheless be subject to civil liability or 
disciplinary action.  A more complex issue is whether an employer that 
wishes to provide controversial drugs, such as emergency contraception, 
may require its pharmacists to dispense these medications despite their 
personal beliefs.  While an employer may wish to accommodate its 
employees’ beliefs, that accomodation will not necessarily be without 
cost.281  However, there will often be a fine line between employment 
discrimination based on personal beliefs and a legitimate business 
decision, thereby making it difficult to prevail in a Title VII claim.282  
Because Title VII may allow a significant number of actual employment 
discrimination cases to fall through the cracks, protection against 
employment discrimination has been included in the proposed statute.283  
Without this additional protection, the effects of the conscience clause 
may be significantly watered down because pharmacies are increasingly 




280 See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text. 
281 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text. 
283 See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text. 
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under the management of chain operations and many pharmacists are 
employees rather than owners.284 
Finally, the proposed statute addresses whether a cause of action is 
created for pharmacists and pharmacies whose rights are infringed.  A 
cause of action may be necessary for these rights to be effective, 
especially if the state has chosen to grant pharmacists protection against 
employment discrimination.285  If a civil or disciplinary action is brought 
against a pharmacist who refuses to dispense, that pharmacist can 
defend on the basis of the conscience clause.  However, in the case of 
employment discrimination, the pharmacist will want to bring the suit.  
Rights of conscience in the workplace might never be enforced, therefore, 
unless there is a private cause of action. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, states may provide pharmacists and pharmacies with 
rights of conscience without infringing upon the constitutional rights of 
patients.  Pharmacists’ beliefs should be respected and accomodated, 
especially when there are ways to do so without depriving patients of 
validly prescribed medications.  Specific conscience clause legislation is 
the best method for protecting pharmacists’ consciences, and such 
legislation also provides the most clarity and certainty when well-
drafted.  Conscience clause legislation should address who is covered, 
whether a religious objection is required, the medications involved, the 
scope of the protection, any requirements for compliance, and whether a 
private cause of action is created.  Such legislation provides adequate 
protection to pharmacists and clarifies the rights of both pharmacists and 
patients.  If such legislation operates in tandem with policies such as 
pharmacist prescribing, doctor dispensing, and doctor referrals to 
pharmacies known to handle the prescription, which have shown 
promise in some states, then patients should have adequate access to 
medications without forcing pharmacists to compromise their beliefs. 
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284 See Dailard, supra note 6, at 11-12.  Major national pharmacy chains include 
Walgreens, CVS, Eckerd, and Wal-Mart.  See Teliska, supra note 33, at 239-40. 
285 See Dykes, supra note 9, at 596. 
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